Needed: ABetter U.S. Negotiating Strategy for Dealing with North Korea

pa href=https://www.cato.org/people/ted-galen-carpenter hreflang=undTed Galen Carpenter/a/p

pOn October 28, 2020, it was my pleasure and honor to be anbsp;panelist at anbsp;symposium sponsored by the Center for the National Interest, “a href=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/time-accept-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-state-171541Time to Accept North Korea as anbsp;Nuclear Weapons State?/a”span /spanIt’s hard to imagine anbsp;current topic with greater importance in international affairs.span /spanUnfortunately, it is increasingly clear that U.S. diplomacy regarding the nuclear issue has been stuck on autopilot for the past three decades, despite anbsp;marked lack of constructive results.span /spanUnless that approach changes dramatically, prospects for success going forward are no better./p
pU.S. policy has been anbsp;model of consistency throughout five administrations, Republican and Democrat, liberal and conservative.span /spanWashington’s demand is that North Korea accept anbsp;a href=https://www.npr.org/2018/06/06/617619192/complete-verifiable-irreversible-a-tough-goal-for-north-korea-summitcomplete, verifiable, and irreversible end/a to its nuclear weapons program.span /spanThe concessions that U.S. leaders have offered in exchange for Pyongyang’s capitulation amount to anbsp;grudging, partial, and very gradual easing of the draconian economic sanctions that both the United States and (primarily because of U.S. pressure) the United Nations have imposed on North Korea over the decades.span /span/p
pAs I’ve a href=https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/libya-forgotten-reason-north-korea-desperately-wants-nuclear-weaponsexplained elsewhere/a, it is exceedingly improbable that any North Korean government will ever accept such an agreement.span /spanPyongyang has two especially powerful incentives to retain its small nuclear arsenal, expand its size, and develop more sophisticated delivery systems—including ICBM’s capable of reaching the American homeland.span /spanHaving anbsp;nuclear‐​weapons capability automatically puts even anbsp;small, poor country in anbsp;new, more influential category in world affairs.span /spanNorth Korean leaders know this, and they desire to exploit the opportunity for greater prestige and power./p
pThose leaders have an even more compelling reason not to give up their country’s nukes; they have witnessed how the United States treats nonnuclear adversaries, and it is not anbsp;pretty sight.span /spanWashington has forcibly ousted numerous regimes deemed obstacles to U.S. geostrategic or geopolitical objectives.span /spanFrom the CIA coups against the governments of Iran and Guatemala in the 1950s to the regime‐​change wars launched against Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, and Bashar al‐​Assad in the twenty‐​first century, U.S. conduct has remained consistently aggressive./p
pThe U.S.-led war against Qaddafi especially made an indelible impression on North Korean thinking.span /spanThe Libyan strongman had concluded an agreement with the United States and its Western allies to relinquish his country’s embryonic nuclear program in exchange for being readmitted to international diplomatic and economic bodies that the West dominated.span /spanLess than anbsp;decade later, those powers double‐​crossed Qaddafi, assisting insurgents to overthrow his regime.span /spanQaddafi himself ended up tortured and killed./p
pIf North Korean leaders previously harbored any willingness to give up their new nuclear deterrent for paper promises, the Libya episode eradicated such thinking.span /spanThey view nuclear weapons as their only reliable means of preventing the United States from pursuing anbsp;forcible regime‐​change campaign with their government in the cross‐​hairs./p
pThe odds are against anbsp;scenario in which they abandon that assumption.span /spanHowever, if U.S. policymakers have any hope that they will do so, Washington must drastically totally refashion its negotiating strategy.span /spanInstead of continuing to insist that Pyongyang implement denuclearization as precondition for (very gradual) normalization of relations, U.S. policymakers need to view normalization as anbsp;process that might eventually lead to denuclearization.span /spanIn other words, U.S. leaders have gotten the sequence of necessary diplomatic steps backwards./p
pPresident Trump’s outreach to Kim Jong‐​un was an important change, but the benefits were vitiated by continuing to demand that Pyongyang agree to denuclearization as anbsp;precondition for additional progress.span /spanInstead, Washington should proposed anbsp;series of interim agreements to build interaction and at least anbsp;modicum of trust.span /spanSuch measures would include anbsp;treaty formally ending the state of war on the Korean Peninsula, diplomatic recognition of North Korea, with the establishment of embassies in Washington and Pyongyang and consulates in at least two other U.S. and North Korean cities; and at least anbsp;partial lifting of economic sanctions./p
pIt is uncertain whether or not those moves would create sufficient trust between North Korea and the United States so that Pyongyang would then agree to (gradually) decommission its nuclear arsenal and abandon its quest for ICBMs.span /spanIt is entirely possible that the United States and the rest of the world may have to learn to live with North Korea as the latest member of the global nuclear weapons club, as it had to do previously a href=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/north-korea-pakistan-libya/561341/with Pakistan/a.span /spanNevertheless, the pursuit of anbsp;rapprochement with denuclearization as the end product rather than anbsp;precondition is at least worth anbsp;try.span /span/p
pMoreover, even if Pyongyang ultimately will not budge on the nuclear issue, East Asia and the rest of the world will be anbsp;safer place if anbsp;decent, normal relationship between the United States and North Korea can be established.span /spanOne thing is readily apparent: the current U.S. approach based on trying to isolate North Korea and penalize it with ever‐​tightening sanctions has not worked, is not working, and will not work.span /spanThe situation cries out for an entirely new policy./p
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