Is the Trump Administration Sabotaging the Planned Summit with Kim Jong Un?

Doug Bandow

Security, Asia

Pyongyang is unlikely to abandon its nuclear weapons unless it believes that the regime would survive the aftermath.

President Donald Trump is set to meet North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. The summit looks more serious after the latter’s surprise visit to China. It was Kim’s first meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping. That would not have happened if Kim and especially Xi were not taking the prospect of negotiations with America seriously.

However, is the Trump administration equally serious? The president’s recent appointments suggest not. Or they suggest that he is not aware of what might be necessary to reach a denuclearization agreement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The Kim dynasty has caused extraordinary suffering for the North Korean people. But that doesn’t mean it is irrational or suicidal. To the contrary, three generations of Kims have played a weak hand well. And so far they have preserved their nation’s unique “social system,” as they call it.

The summit is no concession by Kim Jong-un. To the contrary, the DPRK long has insisted on bilateral negotiations with the United States. If the summit occurs, Kim will receive what his father and grandfather both wanted but never received: to be treated as an equal by the United States.

Is Kim prepared to give up a nuclear arsenal acquired at such great effort and cost? Probably not. He certainly won’t do so for nothing. According to the South Koreans with whom Kim talked, in return Pyongyang expects security guarantees. Whatever the details, that would mean preserving the dynasty and precluding any U.S. attempt at regime change. The end of the U.S.-South Korean alliance and withdrawal of American troops could be conditions. Perhaps more.

In short, the North is unlikely to abandon nuclear weapons unless it believes that the regime would survive the aftermath. At least some advocates of war believe that simple intimidation will work. Fear of a massive attack will convince Kim to surrender, trusting his future to President Trump’s professed beneficence and goodwill.

That is plausible, but only if Pyongyang really imagines itself to be safer abandoning nuclear weapons. That would require believing Washington will not attempt regime change. Unfortunately, successive U.S. administrations have inadvertently created strong disincentives to nonproliferation.