The Arab Spring Has Sprung in Lebanon

Bilal Y. Saab

Security, Middle East

The size of Lebanese Shiite discontent remains unclear, but its geography and audacity are not.

When more than one million people in Lebanon took to the streets on February 14, 2005 to call for the ouster of Syria’s forces from the country, very few expected them to accomplish their goal. After all, Syria had been ruling Lebanon with an iron fist since the end of the 1975-1990 civil war.

Yet they did, and spectacularly so, displaying immense courage and solidarity in the face of violence and demonstrating to fellow Arabs that tyranny need not be their destiny.

But as momentous as the Cedar Revolution was, it was missing one key community: the country’s Shiites. Vastly unenthusiastic about Syria’s withdrawal and worried about its future, Hezbollah instructed its Shiite support base to distance itself from the protests. Many of Lebanon’s Shiites had no love for Syria, having clashed with its troops in the past, but they also weren’t ready to risk their relationships with their main parties – Hezbollah and Amal – for fear of the unknown.

Lebanon’s current uprising, larger than the Cedar revolution and rooted in long-held socio-economic grievances, seems to have drastically subsided this fear. Unique about it is the fact that its members across the country are united in their calls for fundamental political change. And this time, Shiites have joined the struggle.

This is not a good outcome for Hezbollah. Nothing shakes the group’s confidence and even threatens its existence more than discord within its own Shia community. Not even Israel, its number-one enemy. Indeed, Hezbollah will go as far as Lebanon’s Shiites will take it.

During the 2018 national elections in Lebanon, many Shiites in the Bekaa and Baalbek, areas considered as strongholds of Hezbollah, voiced displeasure with the group for its decreasing ability to provide them with basic goods and services due to its taxing war in Syria.

But as real as Lebanese Shiite frustration with Hezbollah had been, I consistently warned against misrepresenting it. I judged that there was never a serious crack in the special bond between the organization and the majority of its supporters, as evidenced by the fact that Hezbollah won big in the parliamentary elections. I did argue, however, that should living conditions continue to deteriorate and be neglected by the party, tensions would rise again.

That is precisely what is currently happening.