Congress Should Seek ‘Poison Pills’ for Any US‐Saudi Nuclear Agreement
Swirling reports of aU.S.-Saudi Arabia dealthat would trade normalization with Israel for U.S. security guarantees are raising questions about what Washington will put on the table.
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A U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement—also known as a “123 agreement” after the Atomic Energy Act’s section that governs such cooperation — could be part of the broader arrangement, per reports that Saudi Arabia isdemandingsuch cooperation as part of this “grand bargain.”
Any other country that possessed Saudi Arabia’s mix ofgross human rights abuses,authoritarian government,malign activities abroadand stated intentions to build anuclear weapon if Iran gets the bomb would be rightly isolated by the U.S., and not be aserious contender for a123 agreement.
The U.S. ought to bedrawing down its Middle East presenceto focus limited resources on more pressing interests in other regions of the world. Nonetheless, if President Joe Biden proceeds, Congress should take steps to make the agreement as stringent and difficult as possible for Saudi Arabia.
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The U.S.-India and U.S.-United Arab Emirates 123 agreements provide examples of ways to make apotential U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal more stringent.
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Saudi Arabiaapproved aNational Project for Atomic Energy in 2017and has been shopping around for foreign assistance. Amajor goal of the Saudi program is to have the complete nuclear fuel cycle. PerSaudi Arabia’s energy minister, this would include “the production ofyellowcake, low enriched uranium, and the manufacturing of nuclear fuel both for our national use and, of course, for export.”
The country has already worked with China toconstruct auranium milling facilityand Riyad has discussed constructing nuclear power plantswith other countries.
The Saudi government claims that it only wants to produce low‐enriched uranium, which is suitable for nuclear energy but not weapons. However, acomplete nuclear fuel cycle would make it much easier to either covertly manufacture fissile material for anuclear weapon over time or quickly “sprint” to aweapon on short notice. Past statements by Saudi Arabia’s political leadership thatRiyad will develop anuclear weaponif Iran does should raise alarm bells about the proliferation risks of aSaudi civil nuclear program.
These risks mean that Congress should do everything in its power to introduce so‐called poison pills provisions that would make the process of finalizing an agreement as difficult as possible. The legislative body can prevent a123 agreement from taking effect though ajoint resolution of disapproval, but such aresolution can be easily overturned by presidential veto. Regardless, Congress still has tools at its disposal.
The U.S.-India and U.S.-United Arab Emirates 123 agreements provide examples of ways to make apotential U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal more stringent.
Because India is anuclear‐armed state, Congress had to pass legislation that granted waivers so the president could negotiate a123 agreement. This legislation, theHyde Act of 2006, established unique demands and requirements. Most importantly, it required ajoint resolution of approval on the final 123 agreement instead of ajoint resolution of disapproval to block the deal.
Although Saudi Arabia does not possess nuclear weapons, Congress could still pursue separate legislation that amends the Atomic Energy Act andlays out conditions and requirementsunique to anuclear deal.
TheU.S.-UAE 123 agreementcontains two unique provisions that should be emulated in aU.S.-Saudi deal. First, the agreement required the UAE to implementmore intrusive safeguardsbefore granting any export licenses for sensitive U.S. technology. Second, the U.S.-UAE agreement established what came to be known as the“Gold Standard”; the UAE pledged to forgo all enrichment and reprocessing activities and facilities. Washington should apply the “Gold Standard” to Saudi Arabia.
Additionally, Congress should make its support for a123 agreement contingent on other actions. For example, in 2009, the Obama administrationdemandedend‐use monitoring of all weapons systems sold to India. The Hyde Act also created anuclear export accountability program. While no public agreement was ever released, later reports suggested that Indiaagreedto “allow the United States to periodically carry out an inspection and inventory of all articles transferred to India.”
The U.S. should similarly link any Saudi nuclear deal to end‐use monitoring of all weapons transferred to Riyad. Since Saudi Arabia started its war in Yemen, the country has used U.S. weapons to commitvast human rights abusesandendangerU.S. troops. Making a123 agreement contingent on U.S. end‐use monitoring of all weapons sent to Saudi Arabia would improve American security.
Put simply, helping one of Washington’s most problematic allies build acivil nuclear program is non‐sensical. The Biden administration should not go ahead with such an agreement in the first place, but if it does Congress should implement poison pills to make the deal as unpalatable as possible for Saudi Arabia.