Can Biden’s ‘Having Both’ Strategy Succeed in the U.S. Competition With China?

In recent months, President Joe Biden sent his Cabinet members — including Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, and climate envoy John Kerry — to Beijing one after another, as part of his administration’s efforts to reengage with China on a range of issues and fulfill its commitment to a “competition without catastrophe” with China but avoid a cold war.

All of their efforts could possibly have paved the way for a Biden–Xi meeting at the G20 Summit, but, instead, Xi Jinping’s failure to attend “disappointed” Biden — although Biden can make another attempt at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation CEO Summit in San Francisco this November. But this perceived failure questions whether Biden’s “having it both” strategy truly helps the U.S. prevail during the great-power competition and ensure another American century.

U.S. competition with China is an asymmetric game, for the Founding Fathers did not design the American democratic system to compete with communist countries. The system’s strength lies in its intent to limit the power of its own government while granting maximum power and freedom to its people. China, in contrast, is a party-state, or “CCP Inc.,” that empowers the party/state by limiting people’s rights, and it can take advantage of democratic rights by mobilizing its entire national resources.

The China Threat Is Underway

China exploits legal loopholes to access sensitive U.S. technology and information by using front companies, joint ventures, cyberattacks, and espionage agents while manipulating American public opinion in favor of China by funding think tanks, lobbying groups, media outlets, and academic institutions. It can conduct activities in the U.S. to serve its national interests through hometown associations, business associations, and Chinese Students and Scholars Associations at U.S. universities. The Chinese Communist Party has even secretly established U.S. police stations.

At the same time, China vehemently forbids the U.S. from engaging in comparable undertakings within its borders. A Chinese law on the management of foreign non-governmental organizations activities in China, enacted in 2017, has restricted the registration and activities of or closed down U.S. NGOs.

Guided by the principle of the socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics, the CCP is able to control the entire Chinese economy. China has been making strategic investments in key sectors, including land near U.S. military bases, medicine, food, education, and technology. Such a substantial presence in these sectors could jeopardize U.S. national security and interests when China engages in intellectual property theft and disrupt critical supply chains.

Capital flows unrestrictedly across borders in the era of globalization. Since China initiated its opening-up policy in 1978, American and Chinese capitals have become deeply intertwined. But Chinese capital is intrinsically tied to the power of the CCP Inc., and American capital must find common ground with the Chinese government, often necessitating the sacrifice of U.S. interests to maximize opportunities in the Chinese market.

To “overtake on the curve” (弯道超车), China requires foreign companies to transfer technology, including sensitive technology, to Chinese firms as a condition to access the vast Chinese market. General Motors agreed to share its technology, including advanced vehicle platforms, engines, and transmissions, to gain access to the world’s largest auto market. Qualcomm and Boeing and many other U.S. companies also sacrificed their technology in exchange for China’s market. The CCP Inc. helps China’s economic expansion at the expense of the U.S.’s technological edge.

Even worse is the fact that American capital helps the CCP’s efforts to suppress democracy within China while seeking benefits for the Chinese interests in the United States. Google introduced a censored version of its search engine in China, restricting access to websites and search results considered sensitive by the Chinese government. Yahoo shared information with the Chinese government that led to the conviction of a Chinese journalist for leaking state secrets. In the U.S., American business entities have also been engaged in lobbying activities linked to China’s Huawei. Regardless of the real intention of the American lobbyists, it can be argued that the CCP has skillfully turned the American market mechanism against American democracy and the capitalist market economy.

Asymmetric Power Balance Hinders Competition

Under the current American democratic system, the U.S. is unable to compete efficiently with China. First, maintaining a democratic system entails higher costs compared to the authoritarian China. The Chinese primarily focus on basic survival needs. The CCP regime has, remarkably, endured into the 21st century, despite China’s having weathered numerous catastrophic upheavals over the past 70 years. In this sense, the CCP can focus on external affairs. Americans not only seek survival but also place paramount importance on individual rights. Thus, democratic governments and politicians must proceed with caution, considering public sentiment and societal concerns.

Second, election campaigns require politicians to spend significant time fundraising, campaigning, and engaging with the public. The polarization of American politics can drain the government’s resources and energy, leaving limited time and capacity to address China’s challenge. Politicians may also be tempted to prioritize short-term political gains over long-term national interests. Chinese leaders and congressmen gain their positions not through election but by “connections” — in Chinese, guan xi.

Third, in addition to budget constraints, the two American parties hold different views on how to balance domestic and foreign policy priorities, which limits the U.S. government’s ability to reach a consensus on a coherent policy toward China. In China, the policy-making process primarily revolves around the seven-seat Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP, led by Xi. Once decisions are made, they are rubber-stamped by the National People’s Congress.

The U.S. government operates on the principle of trust. However, when the U.S. extends the principle of trust to foreign relations, the CCP often makes promises that it does not uphold or of which it even does the exact opposite. The U.S. believed China’s promises before China was allowed to join the WTO. In reality, China has not lived up to its commitments but instead has exploited the WTO loopholes to gain an unfair advantage over the U.S. economy. Xi promised in 2015 that China will not pursue the militarization of these artificial islands, but his regime has installed various military facilities and equipment on these islands in past years, challenging American influence in the region and freedom of navigation.

Apparently, Xi’s China has openly challenged the United States’ dominance by launching global projects one after another. China is progressively moving closer to its objectives despite facing significant backlash from the global community. Conversely, the United States finds itself gradually retreating and responding passively in the face of China’s steady expansions as China utilizes the disadvantages of American democracy to weaken the United States.

The America democratic system once served as the foundation for American prosperity and global dominance. However, this system is ill-equipped to address the complex challenges presented by the CCP today. The United States must confront its own structural challenges and renovate its overhauled system. This requires not simply taking on China but changing the way we think. Otherwise, Biden’s “having both” strategy will fail and, ultimately, allow the U.S. to lose its global dominance over communist China.

Jinghao Zhou is an associate professor of Asian studies at Hobart and William Smith Colleges in New York. He has published six books, in addition to dozens of journal and news articles on Chinese politics and China–U.S. relations. His latest book is Great Power Competition as the New Normal of China–U.S. Relations (2023).

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