General Strangedove, or How I Learned To Stop Winning and Love Defeat

Retired General John Strangedove sat in his spacious office in August. He had three, one for each company whose boards of directors he was on. The phone rang. It was a reporter from the Washington Post. He had forgotten to tell this newest secretary to refer all press inquiries to the company’s public relations department. The reporter wanted to know if the general felt any responsibility for the loss of Afghanistan as the second-year anniversary of the fall of Kabul approached. “It was just fine when I left,” he replied testily and hung up.

He had been preparing testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. Two pesky congressmen were trying cancel a company drone that he had lobbied for. The two maverick lawmakers argued that the drone is redundant with existing systems. It probably was but that was not the point. What is good for the defense industry is good for America. He knew that most of the committee viewed testimony by a four-star as if it were tablet from Mount Sinai and he knew he could save the program. “It will be like hypnotizing chickens” he thought ruefully. (READ MORE from Gary Anderson: Was Putin Right About the Mutiny?)

Unfortunately, the reporter’s question kept coming back into his mind. During his two-year tenure as NATO commander in Afghanistan, he had done everything the Obama administration expected. He had two unwritten but clear missions. The first was to oversee the handover of as many Afghan districts as possible to the government in Kabul and the second was to minimize American and NATO casualties. Most Americans were not thinking about Afghanistan and the administration wanted it kept that way. “Afghanization” and force protection were the watchwords.

Good soldier that he was, Strangedove had undertaken both aggressively. He had gotten his fourth star the hard way by keeping his superiors happy and telling them what they wanted to hear. He had punched all the right tickets. Brigade and division command in Iraq, and a tour as the JCS J-3 as a three-star. Then, a fourth came with his appointment for the Afghanistan gig.

He had accelerated Afghanization beyond the wildest dreams of the administration and nearly eliminated combat casualties by denying approval for high-risk/high payoff missions; after all, that was what special operators were for and any casualties they suffered could be classified if needed. Occasionally, a subordinate commander would “go Patton” on him and wander off the reservation with an overly aggressive operation, but he generally suppressed such adventurism ruthlessly. (READ MORE: Military Recruitment Is Plummeting: Blame the Pentagon)

Amazingly, some of his commanders in the field and even a few on his staff would occasionally rock the boat. Many junior offices would complain that too many districts were not ready for transition and that without US logistics and fire support, many local Afghan commanders were surreptitiously cutting deals with the Taliban leaving effective control to them. As far as Strangedove was concerned that was an Afghan problem.

Some on his staff went so far as to advocate for a decentralization of Afghan governmental and military control to the provinces. They argued that the central government lacked the road networks and air forces to maintain centralized control. While Strangedove understood the rationale, he also knew that any support for such a position would put him in perceived opposition to the administration which had a policy of supporting the existing Afghan regime. Strangedove was a strong supporter of civilian control of the military, particularly, when such a perceived position might be harmful to his career interests.

In Iraq, Strangedove had enjoyed wandering around the battle space visiting small units and handing out his personal challenge coins because it showed positive leadership at the point of the spear. He had initially done this in Afghanistan, but when he visited district headquarters, local commanders and their civilian advisors would almost invariably complain that his Afghanization policy was moving too quickly. He had never liked “negative Nellies.” So, he did the logical thing; he stopped visiting the districts where the forces were so intent on winning the local war that they could not see the big strategic picture.

Subsequently, he confined himself to visiting area headquarters run by general officers who invariably gave more positive assessments than the troops on the ground.

Consequently, he was secretly pleased with the collapse of the Afghans in 2021. The corrupt and arrogant Afghan politicians and generals had made their own beds, and now they would have to lie in them. At the time, he had refused any press inquiries figuring any perceived criticism of the administration or the Pentagon would be bad for business for his various corporate masters. (READ MORE: Afghanistan: How It Became America’s Disaster)

He did feel badly for several of the more junior general officers he had mentored but noted with satisfaction that no one had been held personally responsible for the military and intelligence failures that led to the strategic collapse or the humiliating withdrawal of American personnel and their allies.

He had advised those youngsters on the Strangedove method of keeping superiors happy and ensuring that they received positive reports no matter how bad the situation got. He admired the way those generals had tap danced around the Kabul debacle.

Come to think of it, he now had a title for his memoir, The Strangedove Method. Under his breath he sang, “I am the very model of a modern four-star general.” He realized that the Gilbert and Sullivan original had been a parody, but if the tune fits, why not sing it?

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps officer who served as Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and served as a civilian Advisor in Iraq and Afghanistan

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