How Trayce Jackson-Davis both simplifies and expands the Warriors’ playbook

Options open up in the half-court whenever the rookie big is on the floor.

Synergy — a platform that keeps track of several NBA playtype metrics — has playtype categories for “cuts” and “P&R roll man.” When it comes to the former, the Golden State Warriors are the top team in the league in terms of the percentage of cuts they make on offense; when it comes to the latter, they are 27th in terms of the percentage of possessions finished by the roller in pick-and-roll situations.

That can be attributed to their overall philosophy of not incorporating a high volume of ballscreens in their offense. But that shouldn’t surprise anyone at this point — and nor should their ranking in terms of overall pick-and-roll frequency this season (25.9% of their possessions, 29th in the league).

The main historical reason behind the low pick-and-roll frequency have been personnel based. The Warriors prefer to invert the floor and have their bigs be hubs at the top of the key, on the elbows, and in the low post, with wings who can also moonlight as passers and conduits for constant ball movement — which leaves little room for possessions to slow down to a crawl in order to accommodate high or angled ballscreens with a spread floor.

(Although, as a sidenote, it doesn’t mean the Warriors don’t run spread ballscreen sets at all — they just don’t make it the base of their offense.)

Aside from the likes of Andrew Bogut and JaVale McGee (and to a lesser extent, Damian Jones and James Wiseman), the Warriors really haven’t had a plethora of above-the-rim centers with which they can make use of roll gravity to put pressure on opponents. Of the players mentioned above, only Bogut has the ability to act as both a hub and as a roll threat who has the ability to play above the rim; the others were square pegs who tried to fit in round holes.

Trayce Jackson-Davis isn’t a seasoned veteran like Bogut was, while he isn’t as tall as McGee, Jones, and Wiseman. But he has flashed potential to be the kind of dual threat that Bogut was — both as an athletic pogo stick of a roll-man and as a floor inverter who can seamlessly integrate within their base offensive philosophy.

After having a bit of early trouble with a Memphis Grizzlies team hobbled with injuries, the Warriors locked in and stamped their class (which they failed to do against a previous matchup). Defense became noticeably tighter, while sets in the half court became more concrete and were executed much better than they were to begin the game.

It allowed Steve Kerr to get into his bag of plays, some that he hasn’t whipped out in a while. Some of it was because of the context — the Warriors had a big cushion to work with, allowing Kerr to expand his playbook a bit. But it can also be attributed to having Jackson-Davis on the roster and giving him the requisite playing time he needed to bloom into his current role as the team’s backup five.

Let’s go back to the “cut” and “P&R roll man” playtypes as categorized by Synergy. Cuts happen to be Jackson-Davis’ most frequent playtype (112 possessions, 35.7% of total possessions) and one of his most efficient: 1.384 points per possession (PPP), which is in the upper half (35th) among 99 players who have tallied at least 50 cuts this season.

He’s finished fewer possessions as the roll man in pick-and-roll situations (61 possessions, 19.4% of total possessions) but has been equally efficient: 1.393 PPP, seventh among 66 players this season who have finished at least 50 possessions as the roll man.

Jackson-Davis’ roll equity has made Kerr more comfortable letting his players run ballscreen action, especially with Chris Paul running things at point. Paul constitutes one half of the equation, while Jackson-Davis completes the formula for possessions such as this one:

Delving into a bit of nuance, Jackson-Davis’ presence as the screener and roller forces a decision from opponents in terms of coverages. Paul is typically a ballhandler who eviscerates drop coverage — as evidenced in the possession below, where the Warriors run their “21 Nash” set (a pitch to Paul on the wing, followed by double ballscreens on the side by the initial passer and the five-man):

Jackson-Davis’ roll after setting the screen nails his defender to the floor and forces him toward two choices: Do I step up to take the ballhandler? Or do I stay put in drop coverage to take away Jackson-Davis on the roll?

That decision is made even more difficult whenever it’s Klay Thompson as Jackson-Davis’ partner in two-man actions. Staying in drop to take away Jackson-Davis runs the risk of possessions ending up like this one:

The one-two punch of Thompson being a coverage nightmare for defenses and Jackson-Davis being a threat on the roll has been a ready source of offense for the Warriors as of late. Jackson-Davis’ subsequent dive after the screen inflicts the aforementioned “freeze” moment that nails his man to the floor — enough for Thompson to squeeze a layup past a block attempt:

While running ballscreen actions as the roll man is still his ideal offensive role, the fact that he can also be a decent decision maker within the Warriors’ base offensive scheme is a welcomed bonus — which also allows Kerr to use him occasionally as the decision-making big in 5-out actions.

Increased reps within this system have also improved his ability to make reads such as this one:

And increases Kerr’s confidence in him handling the ball up top in the same manner as Draymond Green does whenever he’s the central decision maker in an inverted-floor setup. Kerr can comfortably run cleverly crafted sets with Jackson-Davis as the central benefactor, with a layer of deception that makes use of both the Splash Brothers.

This one is a doozy:

Thompson relocating to the middle of the lane typically means a “Stack” or “Spain” pick-and-roll is coming, which is a typical pick-and-roll with the addition of a backscreen (typically set by a deadly movement shooter) for the roll man. But it’s window dressing to get Thompson into position for an inverted pick-and-roll for Jackson-Davis, who puts the ball on the floor and gets deep in the paint with Thompson’s help — enough for the switch to be ineffective and for Jackson-Davis to score easily.

To put it plainly, Jackson-Davis allows the Warriors to go to a simple source of offense while also diversifying and expanding their options. While his height limits him in some aspects, his athleticism, screen-setting, and floor awareness compensates his physical shortcomings.

It’s no secret, then, that mostly good things have come from him being the kind of big the Warriors haven’t had in a long time.