How to define success in the next phase of the Israel-Hamas war

The world's attention has left Gaza for the moment due to the Iranian attack against Israel, a major strategic shift in Iranian policy increasing the chance for a regional war. But it is only a matter of time before the spotlight will return to Rafah, the last holdout of Hamas' standing battalions. 

With only forty hostages presumed alive, the rest, both men and women, killed and many sexually assaulted in captivity, Israel has slowly begun preparations for the next military phase of its war against Hamas. But the diplomatic piece is a much more challenging endeavor, as the anti-Israel crowd’s pressure and rhetoric will be relentless. 

A Qatari newspaper has reported that the quid pro quo for American approval of Israel capturing Rafah was not to significantly respond to Iran’s unprecedented attack. But Israel cannot count on President Biden to keep his word as the election gets closer and his advisors tell him to abandon Israel in favor of pro-Hamas progressives in swing states.

Israel is entering the third stage of its battle against Hamas and its patron, Iran. In the first phase, after the horrific intelligence failure of October 7, the IDF rallied and carried out an effective operational plan against a sophisticated terrorist entity maneuvering within hundreds of miles of underground tunnels. America was supportive, even though 69 percent of all protests in the world, even before Israel began its ground operation, were against the Jewish State.

Israel had momentum on its side, but under American pressure, it slowed its advance south to minimize the harm to the civilians who had been deliberately placed in harm's way to turn the West against Israel. Israel has yet to conquer Hamas's last stronghold in Rafah, leaving four to six Hamas battalions untouched and in control of the border between the Sinai and Gaza, the crucial corridor for the resupply of Hamas through Egypt.

Worse, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu mismanaged the public relations of the humanitarian situation and was perceived to be indebted to the hard right for political survival. This has undermined the U.S.-Israel relationship. So round two became a Hamas and Iranian victory.

To Hamas and its leaders, the strategy to win is simple: They must survive underground longer than Israel can sustain its forces above ground. Today, all Israeli troops are removed from Gaza, except a combat brigade securing an East-West corridor dividing Gaza in half, allowing for raids in the north and south of the strip as well as preventing terrorists from moving from the south to north. From Hamas and the anti-Israel international communities' vantage point, it seems that Israel has succumbed to American pressure, with Hamas left standing intact on its southern flank. It is premature to declare a Hamas victory, but it has won this phase of the battle. 

It pleases Iran to see much of the battle against Israel is being waged in the court of public opinion in America, with pro-Hamas demonstrators' victory in getting the administration to demand an immediate ceasefire without a specific linkage to the release of the remaining hostages, another Iranian triumph. 

Now for the decisive phase three of the Hamas war. Gaza is just one battle in Iran's war against America and Israel, with a new chapter beginning with the massive strike against Israel from Iranian territory. Soon the war may turn north and east to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. 

Concerning the war in Gaza, what will Israel have to do to be perceived as a victor and earn the respect of its Arab neighbors as a strong ally? The answer is that Israel must fight and defeat radical Sunni and Shia Islamism, Hamas and Iran, the dual nemesis of those moderate neighbors in the region.

Hamas and its ideology will not disappear from Gaza or the West Bank, no matter how successful Israel is. But what is possible and is essential for Israel to be perceived as the victor is for its citizens in the Gazan envelope communities that were devastated by the Hamas massacre, as well as its citizens on the northern border, to return to their homes and feel secure. 

Second, suppose Israel cannot continue to degrade and dismantle the Hamas military infrastructure throughout the entire Gaza Strip and pursue the battalions still in place. In that case, Israel will lose phase three. America must not tie Israel's hands, as Gaza will transition to an insurgency in phase four, and leaving Hamas in Rafah will energize that insurgency.

Third, Israel, in conjunction with the United States, must make sure that Egypt (or someone else) does a much better job limiting the resupply of arms for Hamas through Rafah and the Philadelphi corridor.

Fourth, America cannot continue to ignore Turkey and Qatar giving sanctuary to Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization. Scrutiny of Qatari funds to American universities must be instituted by Congress and the Department of Education to make sure the funds are not fomenting anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. 

Most importantly, Israel must repair its alliance with the U.S. It does not matter that Biden forced Israel to halt its Gaza war at a crucial time by demanding civilian protection far better than that accomplished by U.S. forces in recent wars. Israel must swallow hard, not only for the arms supplies that it will need in the inevitable northern war but also, more importantly, for American diplomatic cover.  

Victory for Israel means creating a new deterrence in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and with their puppet master in Tehran. After the Second Lebanon War in 2006 with Iranian proxy Hezbollah, despite its failures, Israel enjoyed relative quiet on its northern border for seventeen years. If Israel only has to deal with the occasional missile from Gaza knocked down by Iron Dome and can execute raids to extract terrorists as it does in the West Bank for the next seventeen years, this will be an Israeli victory. An Israeli victory is an American victory. 

Working with an administration that thinks it makes sense to reward the Palestinians, who overwhelmingly support Hamas's October 7 atrocity, is a grim prospect. It will take a new Israeli leader and perhaps a new American president to institute a new vision. As long as Netanyahu and his current coalition remain in power, lacking the trust of the Israeli people and irredeemably tarnished in the eyes of the Biden administration, the process of repairing the relationship will be profoundly handicapped.  Whatever goodwill Israel has received as the perceived victim of the Iranian attack, acquiescing to only a limited response, will evaporate as the November election grows closer and the pro-Hamas agitators receive sympathetic media coverage.

Israel will never get a green light from the West for a conventional victory against a terrorist enemy fighting underground beneath hundreds of thousands of civilians. The predisposition against the Jewish state and its right to exist was made evident by the world community taking Hamas's implausible casualty statistics at face value and blaming Israel before any fact-finding occurred, as in the case of Shifa Hospital, where Israel was reflexively blamed for a misfired terrorist missile killing Palestinian civilians.

However, the most difficult Israeli victory to achieve will be regaining a once-loyal friend, the Democratic Party.

Eric Mandel is director of the Middle East Political Information Network and Mandel Strategies, and senior security editor for the Jerusalem Report.