On the evening of May 1, Georgia’s government got what it wanted. Parliament passed the second reading of its foreign agent bill, moving a step closer to a Russian-style crackdown on the citizen groups that it says represent a shadowy, global “party of war.” 

It may rue the day. 

As the bill moved forward (it’s expected to finish its parliamentary process in mid-May), social media channels were flooding with images of large groups of citizens taking public transportation to protest what is widely seen as pro-Russian and anti-European Union (EU) legislation.  

Long traffic jams formed as demonstrators headed for the heart of Tbilisi. Previous crowds, which have reached as many as 100,000 during two weeks of protest, were expected to be exceeded. Violence again broke out on the streets, as it had a day earlier.  

Numerous arrests and beatings of demonstrators rejecting the bill on non-government organizations (NGOs), widely known as “the Russian law.” There are now some signs that the protests are inspiring a nationwide movement presenting an unprecedented challenge to the ruling party, Georgian Dream. 

This is not just another spell of Georgian political unrest. While last year’s protests against the same draft legislation were well-attended and temporarily successful, the protesters were drawn largely from known opponents of the government. 

This time there is a new dynamic, with large numbers of young people now actively engaged in the political process and creating an uncomfortable reality for the ruling party. Previously, Georgian Dream and its éminence grise, the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, have always skillfully used political apathy among youngsters to its benefit — the 2020 elections registered 57% turnout in the first round of voting, but just 26% in the second round. New elections are due in October and such is the upsurge of political activity, it is no longer safe to assume the ruling party will easily win the upcoming parliamentary elections. 

Indeed, the Tbilisi protests have so far lacked an idea around which the parties and general electorate could unite around. The law on NGOs and the likely undermining of the country’s pro-Western stance, namely, membership in the EU, now serves as a powerful glue and a motivator. Some 86% of Georgians want to join the bloc. And equally surprisingly, there seems no demand for a powerful political figure to lead the protest. For now, at least, these are single-issue protests — demonstrators do not seek a change of government, only the bill’s abandonment. 

But the ruling party is playing a dangerous game. Young people are taking an increasingly tough stance against the Georgian Dream and it’s hard to see how that avoids bleeding into October’s vote. The longer the protests continue, the greater the risk is likely to be. 

The government’s decision to resurrect a bill it promised to abandon in March 2023 initially confused Georgia’s Western backers. The EU had agreed to open membership talks in December and the foreign agents bill flies in the face of the bloc’s standards. It has said the country cannot enter with the law on the statute books. 

Street violence by the police has only strengthened the international outcry. Joseph Borrell, the EU’s foreign affairs chief, Michael Roth, Chair of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, and a number of EU MEPs have condemned what happened in Tbilisi. 

The present version of the law would require, as in 2023, non-government organizations enjoying more than 20% of foreign financial support to report annually to avoid financial ​​penalties.  

The ruling party is intent on passing the law, and on April 29 organized a demonstration in favor by busing in supporters from outside the capital. It was much smaller than the anti-government protests and most composed of older people aged 50 and above. The Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili announced she would veto the law, but the ruling party will still be able to overcome it given its parliamentary majority. 

It is hard to say what prompted the ruling party to re-introduce the bill. There are a number of possibilities but the likeliest is a serious miscalculation of the public mood. Believing the fractured opposition offered little genuine opposition to its re-election for the fourth consecutive time (which the polls have confirmed) and lulled by widespread public apathy, it may just have gone too far. 

It’s true that NGOs seriously irritate the government with investigations into alleged corruption, questionable tenders, and potential shifts in foreign policy. There are indeed pertinent questions about the effectiveness and political motivations of some of the NGOs in Georgia. Yet the ruling party’s language about the sector as a whole is lurid.  

There is a geopolitical dimension too. The law would drive a wedge between Georgia and the West, with the Kremlin seeing itself as the beneficiary.  

Russia indeed holds the cards through its military influence in the occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia and could indeed leverage this tool by making some concessions such as a less tense security situation along the demarcation line, and re-establishment of the economic links between the separatist regions and the rest of Georgia.  

Georgia is approaching a crossroads. Maintaining good ties with the EU and Russia is increasingly difficult given the bloc’s requirements for growing openness and transparency. The protesters are determined that the current route should end in Brussels, and not in Moscow.  

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

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