"We should all take the Grenfell Tower report as a mighty, much overdue wake-up call"

The findings of the public inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire should serve as a stark warning to architects to ensure they fully understand their contractual responsibilities, writes expert witness Paul Hyett.

The attempts by so many so-named "core participants" to blame others presented an unedifying spectacle during the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. As far as architects are concerned, the position of project architect Studio E is of particular importance.

In this respect, the following denouements from the inquiry's executive summary to its Phase 2 report, published on 4 September, make for sober reading for our profession. Studio E, the panel found, "took a casual approach to contractual relations".

To our collective shame, the Grenfell Tower fire had, for too long, been a disaster in waiting

"As architect Studio E was responsible for the design of the external wall and for the choice of the materials used in its construction," it added. Even though the client wanted to swap the zinc rainscreen panels initially specified by the architect for the cheaper, but ultimately deadly, aluminium composite material, "it was the responsibility of Studio E to determine whether the use of such material would enable the building to comply" with building regulations.

With respect to fire spread across external facades, it did not. "Studio E therefore bears a very significant degree of responsibility for the disaster," the report said.

These stark conclusions are especially notable in their firm rejection of Studio E's claims that the practice was only responsible for checking that the work of cladding sub-contractor Harley conformed to the "architectural intent" of the initial design. The inquiry panel was clear that the terms of Studio E's contract with main contractor Rydon "included seeking to ensure that all designs complied with the relevant statutory requirements".

This should act as a sharp warning to all architects to look carefully at the conditions contained within their appointments. This is especially the case with the larger and more complex jobs that usually adopt design-and-build procurement routes. Add to that the ambiguities around liability that can arise through the provision of "design portions" by specialist sub-contractors and all the ingredients are there for chaos.

But be under no illusion: confusion of this kind has long existed across our industry. To our collective shame, the Grenfell Tower fire had, for too long, been a disaster in waiting. Such mayhem should not exist and must be eradicated without more ado if we are to ensure that we have proper conditions under which we can, as architects, effectively and fully discharge our responsibilities.

So, we should all take this as a mighty, much overdue wake-up call. Some architects have, of course, long been diligent in this respect, but most need to look far more carefully at their appointment documents.

Late changes following design-and-build contractors' appointments are endemic in our industry, creating havoc across the board

We should also insist on sight of the engagement terms of others who might be contributing to design to ensure that any overlaps and ambiguities relating to responsibilities are eradicated. We owe it to ourselves, our clients, our insurers, our profession, and above all, to those who depend on us and our industry for the design and delivery of safe buildings.

It is simply not good enough for an architect to examine a sub-contractor's cladding drawings on the basis of checking for compliance with some vague notion of "architectural intent" (whatever that might mean), when the appointment has called for the production of full RIBA Stage 4 and 5 information. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry determined that this remains the case even where there has been some overlap in the responsibilities of architects with other sub-contractors.

Much confusion has of course arisen through a misunderstanding of the term "design", and the rapid increase in the use of bespoke contracts that both developers and design-and-build companies nowadays prefer (in lieu of the various RIBA offerings) for their appointments.

Such bespoke forms, all-too-often hastily cobbled together on a cut-and-paste basis, frequently seek to duplicate the same responsibilities across multiple parties, no doubt in the mistaken belief that such belt and braces strategies will somehow protect those appointing by spreading risk and accountability as far, and as wide, as possible.

The problem with such strategies is that they can, and usually do, confuse roles and responsibilities in exactly the way that the inquiry identified around the development of the cladding package during the Grenfell Tower project. There, risks were compounded as the design-and-build contractor, post accepting the architect under novation, pushed through value engineering changes in pursuit of ill-considered cost cuts.

Such late changes following design-and-build contractors' appointments are endemic in our industry, creating havoc across the board as rapid redesign and changes to specifications are often inadequately researched due to lack of time, or fee, or both.

Don't leave your contracts to others to sort out: get on top of these matters!

None of that might matter to those who partake in such reckless processes until something goes wrong. Then, everyone finds themself engulfed in lengthy and complex litigation. When it goes as badly wrong as happened during the over-cladding works for Grenfell Tower, the consequences in terms of suffering and human tragedy are beyond measure.

Muddle around design responsibilities was, of course, not the only issue that contributed to the failings at Grenfell Tower, as the inquiry's far-reaching report makes clear. But it is a discrete issue that needs major and urgent attention across both our profession and our industry.

As with many areas of practice, the structural engineers have had these matters well covered for years and it's high time architects followed suit. Don't leave your contracts to others to sort out: get on top of these matters!

Ensure that responsibilities are clearly defined, especially between those responsible for design and compliance with building regulations and those responsible for fabrication and manufacture. And if you have, under contract, assumed responsibility, then deliver the goods.

Above all, don't accept liability under circumstances where you don't have the authority to control your work product. As one old sage known to us all says: "No responsibility without authority."

Paul Hyett is co-founder of Vickery Hyett Architects and was an expert witness at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, appointed to report on the architectural design of the tower's refurbishment. He was president of the RIBA from 2001 to 2003.

The photo is by Guy William via Shutterstock.

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