Counterterrorism synergy
IT remains to be seen whether the recent surge in Pakistan-US relations is a reflection of Islamabad’s strategy to reduce the trust deficit between the two countries or Washington’s move, driven by broader geopolitical considerations.
This deficit was caused mainly by the two countries’ differing approaches to Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan’s enthusiasm for CPEC and its projection that China could serve as an alternative to the US. Recently, Pakistan has opened new avenues for cooperation by quietly enhancing its counterterrorism support to Washington. The latest CT dialogue held recently in Islamabad was an expression of both sides’ willingness to expand cooperation.
A day before the dialogue, the US State Department designated the proscribed Balochistan Liberation Army’s military wing, the Majeed Brigade, as a foreign terrorist organisation. The move was notable because only a couple of months earlier, Washington had added the Resistance Front, considered to be an offshoot of the proscribed Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, to the same list.
Many observers saw the addition of the Majeed Brigade as a balancing act between India and Pakistan, given that India had hailed the Resistance Front listing as a diplomatic victory and evidence of America’s acknowledgment that the militant group, which India alleges is backed by Pakistan, was involved in the Pahalgam attack.
By sanctioning the Majeed Brigade, which is linked to the Jaffar Express terrorist attack, Washington appears to be signalling that both the Resistance Front and Majeed Brigade were designated per its internal procedures rather than as a concession to any side. The parallel drawn between the Pahalgam and Jaffar Express incidents reinforces this perception. It is also worth noting that Pakistan had previously asked for the international designation of Majeed Brigade as a terrorist entity, but the request was not entertained at the time.
Restoration of confidence between the US and Pakistan has not come without a price for the latter.
The US and Pakistan have a long history of CT cooperation, dating back to 2001 when both countries formally engaged in a joint effort against the global threat of terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. This engagement, however, has always been overshadowed by constraints arising from mutual mistrust and conflicting geopolitical interests. Despite these challenges, the CT dialogue remained intact, except for a few disruptions after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan.
Even before the Taliban’s return to power, Pakistan had been struggling to maintain cordial relations with Washington. After August 2021, the trust deficit widened into a deep gulf. Under these circumstances, the CT dialogue faced disillusionment as both sides struggled to identify common interests to sustain cooperation.
With Al Qaeda significantly weakened following the killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri, American interest declined. For Washington, the TTP was primarily viewed as Pakistan’s internal problem, despite acknowledging in joint statements that it posed a threat. The group seen by both as a genuine global security concern was the Islamic State-Khorasan, which also had implications for US homeland security.
Pakistan concentrated its CT efforts on IS-K and eventually delivered results on that front, helping to restore America’s confidence in bilateral CT cooperation. Not only did the recently retired Centcom chief, Gen Michael Kurilla, praise Pakistan as a “phenomenal partner in the world of counterterrorism”, but President Donald Trump himself acknowledged Pakistan’s support in handing over an IS-K terrorist to the US.
The progress achieved last year also brought tangible US support for enhancing Pakistan’s investigative and prosecutorial capabilities, developing border security infrastructure and delivering training to more than 300 police officers and front-line responders.
The underlying objective has been to keep the CT dialogue as a continuous and reliable channel of engagement between the two countries.
A comparison of two joint statements, one issued in May 2024 during the Joe Biden administration and the other released last week, clearly illustrates how the CT dialogue has regained its lost momentum. The May 2024 statement was worded cautiously, noting that “Pakistan and the United States recognise that a partnership to counter [IS-K], TTP and other terrorist organisations will advance security in the region and serve as a model of bilateral and regional cooperation to address transnational terrorism threats”.
By contrast, last week’s joint statement not only acknowledged Pakistan’s sacrifices in the fight against terrorism but also expanded the scope of cooperation to include “the threats posed by the Balochistan Liberation Army”, a long-standing demand of Pakistan.
Equally significant, Pakistan has long sought advanced technological support for its CT efforts. The latest statement reflects an agreement to strengthen institutional frameworks, enhance capabilities to respond to security challenges and counter the use of emerging technologies for terrorist purposes. This effectively acknowledges the threat posed by the militant use of drones, and signals that cooperation in this domain is likely to materialise in the coming weeks.
The restoration of confidence between the two countries and the enhancement of CT cooperation have not come without a price for Pakistan. Islamabad has drastically altered its Afghanistan policy, going so far as to treat the ruling Taliban as an adversary. Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit was cancelled on US advice, reportedly due to the Taliban’s growing ties with Russia and their increasing assertiveness.
Second, it has sought to balance its relations with China, operating under the belief that Beijing, as a pragmatic actor, will not view Pakistan’s growing ties with Washington with suspicion. The thinking in Islamabad is that China might welcome such developments, seeing them as an opportunity to elevate Pakistan’s geopolitical and economic stature, which could benefit Beijing at the right time.
However, Afghanistan has re-emerged as a critical factor in Pakistan’s internal security landscape and its ambitions to connect both geopolitically and geo-economically with Central Asia. The concern is that Pakistan’s national security planners often fail to adopt long-term, strategic perspectives, focusing instead on short-term gains. They seem content celebrating India’s current diplomatic and geopolitical discomfort, without anticipating the challenges that may arise once New Delhi absorbs these shocks and recalibrates its approach.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, August 17th, 2025