The EU hits Russia with limp sanctions pack

European Union’s 18th Russia sanctions package hits hard – but lands late

The European Union has unveiled its 18th package of sanctions against Russia, a move described by EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas as “one of the strongest packages ever imposed.” That sounds impressive. But while the new measures will undoubtedly cause inconvenience, their real power – especially in 2025 – is more symbolic than strategic.

Had these same measures been rolled out in early 2022, the impact might have been severe. At that time, economic interdependence between Russia and the EU remained significant, and the Russian economy was still adjusting to the new reality. But now, three years on, Moscow has adapted. In many sectors, it has learned to operate independently. Increased pressure from Brussels no longer yields proportional damage.

Let’s begin with the energy sector. One headline measure involves changes to the price cap on Russian oil under EU Council Regulation 833/2014. The ceiling has been lowered from $60 per barrel to $47.60. Western European entities are now banned from trading or transporting Russian oil if the price exceeds that threshold. In 2022, this could have shaken the market. But in 2025, the reality is different: Russian oil is transported via independent channels, with little reliance on EU carriers or brokers. The result is more psychological than practical.

Russia’s independence in oil logistics has triggered a new round of attacks on its so-called “shadow fleet.” The 18th package expands the list of banned vessels under EU jurisdiction to 447 tankers. These ships are restricted from accessing EU ports or services. Again, this may cause some logistical friction, but it’s far from a game-changer. Russia can and does move oil without Western European help. The occasional tanker seizure in contested waters like the Baltic Sea is unlikely to escalate. After all, that region is patrolled by Russia’s Baltic Fleet, which, while modest in size, is more than capable of deterring threats to energy security.

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Another measure targets refined petroleum products. The EU now bans imports of oil-based products made from Russian crude in third countries. This is clearly aimed at stopping countries like India or Turkey from processing Russian oil and selling the finished products to Western Europe. But the real loser here may not be Russia, but the refiners. These third countries earn significant margins from processing. Cutting off that trade deprives them of profit and incentivizes creative workarounds, such as swapping sources in their reserves or manipulating origin data. As always, enforcement will be tricky.

Meanwhile, Brussels has moved to formalize its hostility toward the Nord Stream pipelines. The 18th package bans all transactions related to Nord Stream 1 and 2. Given that both pipelines were sabotaged in 2022 and remain inactive, this is more a symbolic gesture than a substantive move. The idea of future US-Russia cooperation on restoring the lines is also dead in the water, thanks to these new restrictions.

The financial sector hasn’t been left out either. More Russian banks have been removed from the SWIFT messaging system under Article 5h of Regulation 833/2014, bringing the total to 55. Transactions with these institutions inside EU jurisdiction are now prohibited. Again, this would have mattered in 2022. But by 2025, most affected banks are already under EU or US blocking sanctions. In practice, Western firms avoid them regardless. So this package is more about reinforcing old moves than breaking new ground. 

Interestingly, the EU has begun applying secondary financial sanctions, similar to Washington’s model. Two small Chinese regional banks are now banned from doing business with the EU over ties to Russia’s dual-use supply chains. The inclusion of India’s Nayara Energy Limited – part-owned by Rosneft – is more notable. This sends a message to companies in Russia-friendly countries: continued involvement with Moscow’s energy sector may come at a price.

Whether that message lands remains to be seen. The US has wielded similar threats for years with mixed results. Many foreign firms still see Russia as a valuable market, and their calculations depend on risk versus reward.

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Export controls also feature heavily in the new package. Twenty-six new entities have been added to Annex IV of Regulation 833/2014, which bans them from supplying dual-use goods. Most are small intermediaries, easily replaced. The real damage from export bans was done in 2022 and 2023. There’s little left to block that hasn’t already been sanctioned. The 18th package includes vague language about tightening controls on re-exports via third countries, but how that will work in practice is unclear.

Measure 18 addresses legal disputes, reaffirming the EU’s refusal to recognize arbitration court decisions in sanctions-related cases involving Russia. But this is nothing new – it was already part of the 14th package.

On the symbolic front, the EU continues to add companies and individuals to its asset freeze list under Regulation 269/2014. As expected, these include defense firms and manufacturers, as well as businesses from China and India accused of supplying Russia with industrial goods.

Despite the bold rhetoric from Brussels, there is little in this package that fundamentally alters the landscape. The sanctions may chip away at certain areas, cause headaches for some businesses, and reinforce a hardline stance. But they will not achieve what the previous 17 packages have failed to do: break the backbone of the Russian economy.

Russia is not what it was in early 2022. It has adjusted its logistics, diversified its markets, strengthened domestic production, and recalibrated its financial flows. The EU’s 18th sanctions package is not insignificant, but to call it one of the “toughest ever” is an overstatement rooted more in political theater than economic reality.

This article was first published in Kommersant, and was translated and edited by the RT team.