Iran’s Military Power: Regime Survival and Regional Dominance

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s address to graduates of the Iranian Naval Academy, 9 September 2018:

“Today, the policy that the Front of Arrogance—headed by the oppressive and cruel United States— has adopted is a malicious policy. They have defined their interests in causing instability throughout many parts of the world, particularly in our region…Their goal is to prevent an Islamic power in the region from emerging and rising…The Islamic Republic has stood up against this policy with complete power… My dear ones, what has astounded intelligent people around the world is that with reliance on Allah the Exalted and with reliance on national power, the Islamic Republic has managed to defeat the United States in achieving its main goal in the region.”1

Throughout its 40-year history, the Islamic Republic of Iran has remained implacably opposed to the United States, our presence in the Middle East, and our support to Israel. While attempting to strengthen its deterrence against foreign attack and influence, Tehran has committed itself to becoming the dominant power in the turbulent and strategic Middle East. Its ambitions and identity as a largely Persian Shia power in a region composed of primarily Arab Sunni states often put it at odds with its neighbors, most of which look to the United States and the West to guarantee their security.

Iran sees itself as closer than ever to achieving its goals. Tehran has played the cards dealt it by the fall of Saddam, the uprising in Syria, the rise and retreat of ISIS, and the conflict in Yemen. It leads a cohesiveif informal bloc of Shia and Alawi state and nonstate actors—its “Axis of Resistance” against the West.Meanwhile, a perception that the United States is disinterested and disengaged pervades the region.

By applying a rigorous lessons-learned process during decades of conflict in the Middle East, Iran has adapted its military capabilities and doctrine to account for developments by the United States and itsallies. Although still technologically inferior to most of its competitors, the Iranian military has progressed substantially over the past few decades.

To achieve its goals, Iran continues to rely on its unconventional warfare elements and asymmetric capabilities— intended to exploit the perceived weaknesses of a superior adversary—to provide deterrence and project power. This combination of lethal conventional capabilities and proxy forces poses a persistent threat. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force leads Iranian power projection through a complex network of state andnonstate partners and militant proxies. Iran’s conventional military emphasizes niche capabilities and guerilla-style tactics against its technologically advanced adversaries. Its substantial arsenal of ballistic missiles isdesigned to overwhelm U.S. forces and our partners in the region. Its swarms of small boats, large inventory of naval mines, and arsenal of antiship missiles can severely disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz—a strategic chokepoint critical to global trade. Each of these forces are becoming increasingly survivable, precise,and responsive.

In more recent years, with the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, Iran has taken nascent steps toward developing a limited expeditionary capability. Iran’s conventional forces are now in the regional power projection game as well. At the same time, modern conventional capabilities will be open to Iran for the first time since the revolution, as the UN arms embargo is scheduled to end by October 2020. With these opportunities, we could begin to see significant changes in Iranian strategy and capabilities, as Iran becomes a moretraditional military force.

As Tehran expands its capabilities and role as both an unconventional and conventional threat in theMiddle East, it is more important than ever that we understand Iran’s military power and the threat itposes to our interests, our allies, and our own security.

Robert P. Ashley Jr

Lieutenant General, U. S. ArmyDirector
Defense Intelligence Agency

Introduction/Historical Overview

Persia, as Iran was known before 1935, was one of the great empires of the ancient world. Its military history dates back more than 2,500 years. The country in its present form—the Islamic Republic of Iran— was established in 1979 after the Islamic Revolu- tion. Iran is a theocratic republic with a supreme leader appointed for life as head of state and the highest-ranking political, military, and reli- gious authority under the principle of velayat-e faqih (rule of the Islamic jurist), a philosophy inShia Islam reinterpreted by Iran’s first supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, that calls for clerical oversight of elected institutions.

1921–1979: The Shah’s Army

The modern Iranian military originated in the early 1920s after Reza Khan, a general in the Persian Cossack Brigade, helped lead a coup to strengthen the power of the Persian shah(king), Ahmad Shah Qajar. In 1921, Reza was made the commander of all of Iran’s disparatemilitary elements, which he combined to form the basis of the modern Iranian military, theArtesh (“army” in Persian). As a top priority for Ahmad Shah, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces then began a long-term effort to grow

and modernize. After becoming prime minister, Reza Khan orchestrated his own appointment as shah in 1925. Renamed Reza ShahPahlavi, the new king enacted a secular civil code and set out on a broader modernization of the country, to include the military.4

Events throughout the 20th century contributed to Iran’s long-held suspicion of foreign powers.During World War II, British and Soviet forces invaded Iran to secure oil resources and pro-tect Allied supply lines to the Soviet Union. Although Iran was officially neutral in the war, the Allied powers considered Reza Shah to be too close to Nazi Germany and forced him to abdicate, installing his son—Mohammad RezaPahlavi—as shah in 1941. A decade later, the elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossa-degh, nationalized the British-owned Iranianoil industry. Britain imposed an economic embargo, and a power struggle between the shah and Mossadegh ensued. After the shahfled Iran, the United States and the United Kingdomin1953organizedasuccessfulcoup—called Operation AJAX—with support from Iranian royalists to overthrow Mossadegh and strengthen the power of the shah.5,6

Iranian protestors during the 1953 coup.

After the 1953 coup, Mohammad Reza Shahaccelerated efforts to transform Iran into a West-ernized and dominant regional power. One ofhis top priorities was to build a strong military,leveraging close ties to the United States duringthe Cold War. Funded by increasing oil revenue, the Artesh acquired a wide range of advanced weapon systems during the 1960s and 1970s,primarily from the United States. Tehran’s pro- curement of American arms included F-4, F-5,and F-14 fighter aircraft; AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters; M60 tanks; HAWK and SM-1 sur-face-to-air missiles (SAMs); and TOW antitankguided missiles (ATGMs). Iran also purchased British tanks and corvettes, French patrol craft, and Soviet armored vehicles.7,8,9,10,11

By the mid-1970s, Tehran became the largestcustomer of U.S. military equipment. At thetime of the revolution, its military was one of the most capable in the region, with more than400,000 personnel. However, Iran still required extensive U.S. training and technical supportto operate and maintain its advanced mili- tary equipment. Iran ordered other advanced systems from Western suppliers before the revolution—including F-16s, F-18s, frigates,destroyers, and submarines from the UnitedStates—but these were never delivered.12

The Iranian military was largely unproven in combat until the mid-1970s, when the shah deployed Artesh forces to Oman alongside the British at the request of the sultan to helpquell an insurgency. Iran first deployed spe- cial forces to Oman in late 1972, followed by a battalion of paratroopers in 1973. By 1974, the Imperial Iranian Task Force numbered more than 3,000 troops, with artillery, heliopter, fighter aircraft, air defense, and navalsupport. Tehran rotated its deployments every3 months to maximize the number of return- ing personnel with combat experience. By the withdrawal of most Iranian forces after 1975, some 15,000 Iranian troops had served in Oman with more than 500 killed in action.13,14

Under Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule, Iran becameincreasingly autocratic. Public disapproval for the regime grew, furthered by an economic recession and public perceptions of the shah as a corruptU.S. puppet.15 In the late 1970s, widespread pro- tests representing most segments of Iranian soci- ety increased across the country. By 1979, the unrest grew into a revolution. Popular Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had been inexile, had become the central figure of the revolu-tion and opposition to the shah, who then fled Iranin January 1979. Khomeini returned to Tehran on 1 February and called for nationwide demonstra- tions. Clashes between armed opposition groups and government forces broke out. Ten days later, the Artesh declared that it would remain neutral to prevent further casualties, effectively ending the revolution with Khomeini in power.16

1979–Present: The Guardians of the Revolution

In a referendum on 1 April 1979, Iranians approved a new constitution establishing a theo- cratic republic based on velayat-e faqih with Khomeini as supreme leader, ending 2,500 years of monarchical rule. On 5 May, Khomeini estab- lished the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), consolidating various militias that had formed during the revolution into a single force loyal to the new regime, in parallel with the Artesh.17 During the first few years after the rev- olution, fearing internal unrest stemming from old-regime allegiances and antirevolutionary activity, the regime conducted a series of purges through arrests, trials, and executions that affected as many as 4,500 military personnel and nearly 6,000 activists, effectively eliminat- ing any remaining opposition.18,19

On 4 November 1979, a group of Iranian stu-dents loyal to Khomeini took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking 52 Americans hostage and leading the United States tosever diplomatic relations with Iran. The cri- sis lasted 444 days before the regime returnedthe hostages to the United States. On 24 April 1980, an attempted rescue by U.S. Special Forces—called Operation EAGLE CLAW—failed when two aircraft collided during a sand storm at a staging area in the Iraniandesert, killing eight U.S. servicemembers.

The Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis left Iran diplomatically isolated and militarily weak-ened. Iran also lost access to tens of thousands of foreign technicians to support the advanced military equipment it had purchased under theshah, while deliveries for U.S. and British spareparts were canceled under an arms embargo. Desertions and purges drained roughly 40–60 percent of the Artesh’s manpower, leaving the military with a severe shortage of trained per- sonnel and professional leadership.21

Saddam Hossein sought to capitalize on Iran’spost-revolutionary turmoil after years of ter- ritorial disputes and competition for regionalinfluence. On 22 September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. Saddam justified the attack as necessary toprevent Iran from exporting the revolution and overthrowing his regime, which Iranian leaders had advocated.

Initially disorganized and poorly trained, the IRGC was forced to begin to professionalize torepel the Iraqi invasion, which the diminished Artesh was unable to do on its own. The IRGC and Basij, a volunteer paramilitary reserve force, relied on guerrilla-warfare tactics and later used extremely costly human wave attacks along the front.22,23 By June 1982, Iran had pushed back Iraqi forces and recovered nearly all of its lostterritory. Saddam proposed a ceasefire, but Khomeini rejected the offer. Tehran’s goals hadshifted from liberating captured land to over- throwing Saddam and expanding the revolution. The next month, Iran launched a counterattack into Iraq and generally remained on the offen- sive for the remainder of the war.

of foreign technicians to support the advanced military equipment it had purchased under the shah, while deliveries for U.S. and British spare parts were canceled under an arms embargo. Desertions and purges drained roughly 40–60 percent of the Artesh’s manpower, leaving the military with a severe shortage of trained personnel and professional leadership.21

Saddam Hossein sought to capitalize on Iran’spost-revolutionary turmoil after years of ter- ritorial disputes and competition for regionalinfluence. On 22 September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. Saddam justified the attack as necessary toprevent Iran from exporting the revolution and overthrowing his regime, which Iranian leaders had advocated.

Initially disorganized and poorly trained, the IRGC was forced to begin to professionalize torepel the Iraqi invasion, which the diminished Artesh was unable to do on its own. The IRGC and Basij, a volunteer paramilitary reserve force, relied on guerrilla-warfare tactics and later used extremely costly human wave attacks along the front.  By June 1982, Iran had pushed back Iraqi forces and recovered nearly all of its lostterritory. Saddam proposed a ceasefire, but Khomeini rejected the offer. Tehran’s goals hadshifted from liberating captured land to over- throwing Saddam and expanding the revolution. The next month, Iran launched a counterattack into Iraq and generally remained on the offensive for the remainder of the war.

using Soviet-supplied Scud missiles in October 1982 after Iran invaded Iraqi territory. By 1984, Iraq had expanded its attacks on population centers, using strategic air raids, artillery shelling, and Scud missiles, in what became known as the “War of the Cities.” Iran purchased its own Scuds from Libya andNorth Korea for use against Iraqi population

centers, launching its first ballistic missiles inMarch 1985. By the end of the war, however, Iran had acquired and launched significantly fewer missiles than Iraq.30

Starting in 1984, attacks on merchant ship- ping and oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf—called the Tanker War—became an increasingly significant part of the conflict.In 1987, the U.S. Navy began to escort re-flagged Kuwaiti oil tankers as part of Oper-ation EARNEST WILL. On 14 April 1988, the USS Samuel B. Roberts was struck by an Iranian naval mine. In response 4 dayslater, the United States launched Operation PRAYING MANTIS against Iranian navalforces, sinking several Iranian vessels. On3 July 1988, the USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655, mistaking the aircraft for an attacking Iranian F-14. All 290 pas- sengers and crew were killed. Tehran stillbelieves the United States deliberately shotdown the civilian airliner.31,32

By mid-July 1988, Iraqi troops had driven back into Iranian territory, and Tehran had grown increasingly weary of the war’s progress. Believing they lacked the support and resources to defeat Saddam, military leaders convinced the supreme leader of the need to end the war. On 20 July, Khomeini accepted a UN ceasefire resolution with great reluctance, stating publicly the decision was more painful than drinking from a “poisoned chalice.” The war officially ended on 20 August 1988 with the ceasefire observed across the front.

The Iran-Iraq War—which Iran refers to as the “Imposed War” and the “Sacred Defense”— lasted 8 years with more than 200,000 Iranian troops and civilians killed.34,35 Although dev- astating for Iran, it helped solidify popularsupport for Khomeini’s new regime.36 The warhad a significant psychological impact on the future of the Iranian military and Tehran’ssecurity policy. Tehran viewed Western sup- port for Saddam as proof of efforts to counter the Islamic Revolution. Syria was one of the few countries to support Iran during the war, establishing a key relationship that has per-sisted for decades. Heavy military and civil-ian losses, Saddam’s use of chemical weapons

Image Source: AFP

and ballistic missiles, the West’s embargo of Iran and support for Iraq, and military engagements with U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf all led the regime to emphasize asymmetric capabilities and reinforce the necessity of self-reliance for decades to come. The warcontributed to Tehran’s belief in the necessity of working with Shias, disenfranchised Sun- nis, and nonaligned countries as an “Axis of Resistance” against the West.37,38

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has adapted its military thinking and approachto modern conflict. During the 1990s, Iranexpanded its outreach to Shia communities and

Tehran also invested heavily in advancing its conventional weapons capabilities, particularly ballistic missiles, to better prepare itself againstfuture Iraqi attacks. Iran acquired significantassistance from other countries, includingNorth Korea and China, to establish domesticproduction capabilities for major weapons pro- grams. In the late 1980s, Iran also established a nuclear weapons program, which it halted in the early 2000s.39

After the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in2001 and Iraq in 2003 and the 2006 Isra-el-Hizballah War, Tehran began to adjust itsmilitary doctrine to better deter and counter the threats from technologically advanced Western militaries. Tehran concentrated on equipping its armed forces with niche capa-bilities emphasizing asymmetric tactics. The U.S. presence in the region created a senseof encirclement in Tehran, which continued to believe that Washington ultimately sought to overthrow the regime. During the Iraq War, Iran established strong ties with Shia militia groups, some of which have receivedIranian financial backing for decades. Using Iranian-provided weapons, these groups were responsible for at least 603 U.S. personnel killed in Iraq between 2003 and 2011.40,41

Since the Arab Spring, the start of the Syrian civil war, and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), Tehran has becomeincreasingly involved in regional conflicts— particularly in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—as itresponds to new security threats and seeks tostrengthen its position as a regional power. Iran has committed extensive resources and deployed military forces to support key part- ners in these struggles, adapting its long- standing model of proxy warfare to incor- porate a more conventional application of military power.42

In 2015, Tehran agreed to the Joint Compre- hensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which placed restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. Although Iran saw some improvement in its economy and a correspond- ing increase in government spending, includingthe defense budget, the benefits of integrationinto the world economy that Tehran and the Iranian public expected after the JCPOA neverfully materialized. In May 2018, the UnitedStates withdrew from the JCPOA and began reimposing unilateral sanctions on Iran.

In April 2019, the U.S. State Department for- mally designated the IRGC as a foreign terroristorganization (FTO) and announced it would notrenew exemptions for select countries to import Iranian oil.43,44 In response to these actions, Iran began its own counter-pressure campaign, which has included gradually exceeding some of the nuclear-related limits stipulated in the JCPOA and conducting provocative maritime actions and unconventional warfare attacks against U.S. allies and interests. Amid this tension, Iran also shot down a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and seized a British oiltanker.45

National Military Overview

Iran’s armed forces consist of two sep- arate, parallel militaries—the Artesh, or regular forces, and the IRGC. The Artesh, which long predates the revo- lution, focuses on defense against externalthreats; the mission of the IRGC, formed

from armed militias during the revolution, is to defend the regime and its Islamic system of government from any threat, foreign or domestic. Iran’s national police force, the Law Enforcement Force (LEF), is also considered part of the armed forces.

Iran views the United States as its greatest enduring threat and believes the United Statesis engaged in a covert and “soft war” to subvert the regime, undermining what Iran perceives as its rightful place as a regional power.46,47,48Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei main-tains a deep, long-standing distrust of U.S. inten- tions.49 Many regime elites view regional dynam-ics through the lens of perceived U.S. aggression,leading some to adopt the extreme view that theUnited States created ISIS in part to weakenIran and its allies.50 Distrust of the United States predates the regime’s founding, dating back tothe 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mossa- degh that returned the shah to power.51

Iran has focused on preparing and equipping its military forces for defense against air attack and ground invasion by a technologically superior adversary, primarily the United States. The U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan inthe early 2000s and international scrutiny of Iran’s nuclear program raised Iran’s fears of encirclement and potential Western attack.52,53

Tehran recognizes that it cannot compete with the United States on a conventional level and has prioritized the development of defensive capabilities that emphasize asymmetric tacticsto protect the country and the regime.54

In recent years, Tehran’s immediate perceivedthreats have shifted to those coming from regional state and nonstate actors. Iran probably views Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Sunni extrem- ist groups, such as ISIS, as its next most dangerous threats because of their immediacy andproximity to Iran’s territory, allies, and regional influence.  Iran’s expanding regional activities have only exacerbated these views. The growth in militant Sunni extremism, particularly ISIS, and Iran’s perception of its regional adversaries ’growing military capabilities has prompted Tehran to adjust some of its military modernization priorities.

 Iran’s latest national development plan reflects this shift in threat perceptions by emphasizing a broader range of conventionalcapabilities than previous plans.58,59

National Security Strategy

Tehran’s national security strategy aims toensure continuity of clerical rule, maintain stabil- ity against internal and external threats, secureIran’s position as a dominant regional power, andachieve economic prosperity.60 Iran has devel- oped its security and military strategies based on these four enduring strategic objectives.

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• Ensure Continuity of Clerical Rule. Thesupreme leader’s position is based on the pop- ular acceptance of velayat-e faqih. To ensurethe regime’s continued legitimacy with theIranian populace, Tehran attempts to con- trol much of the domestic political, social, and cultural environment and promote its interpretation of Islamic ideology.61,62
• Secure the Nation From Internal and External Threats. The regime uses its military and security capabilities to counter internal threats from political and ethnic opposition movements and terrorist groupsand to prevent neighboring states’ instabil- ity from spilling over or causing violence in Iran.63 The military defends Iranian terri- tory from foreign adversaries—including perceived existential threats, such as theUnited States, and regional rivals, suchas Israel and Saudi Arabia—and provides support to allies and partners to counter regional threats.64• 
• Become a Dominant Regional Power.
• Tehran aspires to lead a stable regionalorder in which it has dominant influence. In Iran’s vision for the region, its allies remain intact, the influence of the United States and U.S. regional partners isdegraded, and Sunni extremist groups are defeated.65,66,67 In pursuit of these goals, Iran provides extensive military, advisory,and financial assistance to allies and part- ners, seeking to protect its regional inter- ests and pressure adversaries.

• Attain Economic Prosperity. Domestically,President Hasan Fereidun Ruhani’s priorityis to achieve national economic prosperity by reducing subsidies to the populace, curbing

corruption, reforming the financial sector, andattracting foreign investment.68,69,70 Tehran aims to balance foreign investment and part- nerships with the priority it places on economicself-sufficiency, in part to reduce the effects of U.S. and multilateral sanctions.71,72,73

Iran remains committed to modernizing its mil- itary, forging new partnerships, and building the capacity of its partners across the region— including designated FTOs—all while balanc-ing a desire to benefit from integrating into theglobal economic system. Despite some internal instability, Iranian military and security forces have also proven able to manage public unrest and low-level insurgencies from several ethnic opposition movements.74,75

Stability Issues

Since the 1979 revolution, the regime has reg- ularly cracked down on dissent to maintain political stability. Iranian political and ethnicopposition groups are largely localized and lack unity, posing little threat to the regime. Iran’sinternal stability continues to be threatened bya growing schism between the country’s lead- ers, dominated by military and clerical elites, and the common people. The past 40 years have seen a growth in income inequality, increasedIRGC political influence and control of key economic sectors, sustained sectarian and ethnic tension, violent suppression of dissent and reformists, persistent gender inequality, and tension stemming from the military’s involvement in regional conflicts.

In 2009, after the disputed reelection of conserva- tive President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a looselyorganized opposition called the Green Movementemerged with large-scale protests demanding democratic reforms. The demonstrations markedthe country’s most significant unrest since therevolution. Bolstered by the Internet, hundreds of thousands of protesters turned out across the country. The government responded by ordering security services to crack down, which resulted indozens of deaths, hundreds of arrests, restrictedaccess to social media, and the closure of several newspapers. The regime quelled the unrest and nearly eliminated the Green Movement.76

Between December 2017 and January 2018, small incidents of civil disobedience converged into widespread public protests, the largest unrest Iran has faced since 2009. Some protes-tors challenged Iran’s foreign policy—including

its involvement in regional conflict and support toproxy groups—but most focused on economic andsocial issues. Elected in 2013, President Ruhani promised increased financial benefits and eco- nomic growth, but these have not translated into an improved standard of living for everyday Ira- nians. While oil output had risen before the reim-position of U.S. sanctions, significant economicgrowth did not follow, and domestic prices for both food and fuel increased.77

Some longstanding opposition groups, mostly originating from minority ethnic and religiousgroups, continue to challenge Iran’s internal secu- rity. Along the western border, the regime faces several militant Kurdish opposition groups— including the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK)—which advocate for increased auton- omy and the right to Kurdish self-determination. Armed opposition from PJAK has been especiallyviolent, resulting in dozens of Iranian deathsannually since 2005.78 Iran also faces periodic violence from Baluchi militants in southeastern Iran along the Pakistani border. The most prom- inent of these groups, Jaish ul-Adl (JAA), period- ically attacks Iranian military facilities, border posts, and security patrols and occasionally takes military and security personnel hostage.79,80 JAA hampers Iran-Pakistan relations, with Tehran accusing Islamabad of failing to curb Baluchi militants operating from Pakistani soil.81 The Iranian military conducts counterinsurgency campaigns against the Kurdish and Baluchi mil- itants in these regions on a nearly annual basis.

The most well-known group opposed to theregime is the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran

Iranian protestors after the disputed 2009 presidential elections.

(MEK). The MEK, founded in 1965 by Muslimstudents advocating a combination of Marxist communism and Islamist ideology, is an Ira-nian political-militant organization in exile thatproposes the overthrow of the Iranian regime to establish itself as a new government. After ini-tially supporting the 1979 revolution, the MEKfought on behalf of Saddam late in the Iran-Iraq War and was responsible for a series of bomb- ings and assassinations in the 1990s and early2000s. Widely unpopular in Iran, the MEK remains one of the regime’s foremost internalsecurity concerns. Formerly designated as anFTO by the United States, the Iranian govern-ment still considers the MEK a terrorist group.82

External Defense Relations

Tehran maintains defense and security ties to both state and nonstate actors to project power and support Shia groups and Shia-led govern-ments in the Middle East. Iran relies on itsregional partnerships to help counter perceived threats from Sunni extremist groups, adversar- ial states, and Western military presence in the region. Iran refers to its efforts to build a regionalnetwork to counter Israeli and Western influence

as the “Axis of Resistance,” which includes Iran,Syria, Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, the Huthis,and some Palestinian militants. Beyond these closer allies, Tehran seeks to cultivate relationswith other countries; Iran is also a member of the Nonaligned Movement and has observer status with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Particularly in recent years, Tehran has commit- ted extensive resources and deployed military personnel to support key partners facing internalconflicts. Since at least 2012, Iran has escalatedits involvement in the Syrian civil war to include providing arms, training, advisers, and select combat personnel to support the Syrian regime. Since at least 2014, Iran has also provided direct military assistance—including IRGC advisers, training, and materiel support—to Iraqi Shia militias to help combat ISIS, which Tehran views as a critical national security threat, andto strengthen its influence in Iraq.

Iran maintains strong defense ties to Hizbal-lah in Lebanon—its most significant and oldestnonstate partner and a core member of Teh-ran’s “Axis of Resistance”—and provides sup- port to some Palestinian groups in an attempt to pressure Israel. Iran also provides advanced

The “Axis of Resistance”

Iran uses the term “Axis of Resistance” to describe its loose confederation of like-mindedstate and nonstate actors across the Middle East to counter Western influence. These part-ners, proxies, and allies include the Asad regime in Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, Shia mili-tias in Iraq, the Huthis in Yemen, Bahraini militants, and some Palestinian groups. Most of these are Shia entities, but select Sunni groups—like HAMAS—also align with Iran on key issues. The axis helps Tehran extend its influence in the region and provides a degree ofstrategic depth for Iran.83

Tehran maintains particularly close mili-tary-to-military ties with Syria and Iraq and has signed basic military cooperation agreements with Afghanistan, Belarus, China,Oman, Russia, South Africa, Sudan, and Venezuela.

Iran has also held discussions on defense and security issues with a wider range of countries, including Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Djibouti, India, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Qatar, Tanzania, Turkey, and Turkmenistan.

Djibouti and Sudan have since severed diplomatic ties with Iran. Tehran has also pur- chased military equipment from Russia,China, North Korea, Belarus, and Ukraine.106

Military cooperation between Russia and Iranhas grown significantly in recent years, despite Tehran’s uncertainty about Moscow’s long-termregional objectives.107 Iran and Russia have coop-erated to support Asad’s regime in Syria since at least 2015. Iran has briefly allowed Russian combat aircraft to use its Hamadan Airbase as astopover to launch strikes in Syria, marking thefirst time Tehran has permitted a foreign mili- tary to use its territory since the Islamic Revolu- tion. Iran also seeks to procure Russian military hardware. In 2016, it completed its high-profilepurchase of the Russian SA-20c air defense sys-tem, which provided Iran with its first capabilityto defend against a modern air force.108

The Iranian military is also increasing its defense diplomacy efforts, particularly through near-continuous naval deployments beyond its immediate neighbors. Since 2009, Iran has sent small naval groups to “show the flag” through a series of port calls overseas and counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Intended to enhance its soft power, Iran’s use of naval diplomacy has demonstrated its capability to conduct out-of-area operations increasingly farther from Iranian shores, extending from the Mediterranean Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait in the west to the Indian Ocean and Strait of Malacca in the east.

In 2011, the IRIN made its first transit through the Suez Canal since the Islamic Revolution, fol-lowed by its first ever port visits to China in 2013and South Africa in 2016. Sometimes in conjunction with these port calls, Iran has conducted basic joint naval exercises—such as search and rescue drills—with China, Djibouti, India, Italy, Oman, Pakistan, and Russia.

Iran is also a member of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), a 35-member regional Search and Rescue Exercise in Bangladesh in naval cooperation forum. Tehran participated 2017 and hosted the sixth biannual IONS con-in the IONS’s inaugural International Maritime ference in April 2018 in Tehran

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