Operation Iceberg — Okinawa Invasion in 1945

Battle for Okinawa, 24 March -30 June 1945 Navy.mil

Recollections of Commander Frederick Julian Becton, USN, Commanding Officer of the destroyer USS Laffey (DD-724) which, despite being struck by eight Japanese suicide (kamikaze) aircraft on 16 April 1945, did not sink.

Adapted from Frederick Julian Becton interview in box 2 of World War II Interviews, Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command.

I am Commander Frederick Julian Becton, Commanding Officer of the USS Laffey. The Laffey was built in Bath, Maine and was commissioned in Boston, Massachusetts, at the Navy Yard on February 8th, 1944.

After a brief shakedown period, the ship participated in the Normandy Invasion in June 1944, after which she took part in the Cherbourg [France] bombardment on June 25th, 1944 and suffered an eight-inch [German artillery shell] hit which fortunately did not explode.

Upon returning to the States for repairs and alterations, the ship proceeded to the Pacific and joined Admiral [William F. “Bull”] Halsey’s Third Fleet in November, 1944, for strikes against the Philippine Islands during the month of November.

The ship joined the 7th Fleet under Admiral Kinkaid at Leyte Gulf [Philippines] in early December, 1944 and took part in the landing of the 77th Division of the U.S. Army at Ormoc Bay, on December 7th, 1944. This was our first experience with the Kamikaze Suicide Corps [units of Japanese aircraft turned into flying bombs intended to be crashed by their pilots into U.S. Navy ships to sink or severely damage them]. The ship and the whole convoy were under incessant attacks from about 10 o’clock in the morning until dark that evening.

The next landing the ship participated in was at Mindoro on December 15,1944.

The next landing was about two weeks later when the ship left Leyte Gulf on January 2nd, and proceeded to Lingayen Gulf [also in the Philippines] to assist with the softening up activities and bombardment prior to the Army landing on January 9th, 1945.

We remained in the Lingayen Gulf area until about the 22nd of January and then proceeded to join Admiral Mitcher’s task force at Ulithi.

Participated in Tokyo Strikes.

The next operation in which the ship participated was the strikes on Tokyo in mid-February 1945, after which the carrier task groups headed south to support the Iwo Jima landing. We went back for the second strikes on Tokyo about the 24th of February, and returning from that, went into Ulithi where we remained until we were ready for the Okinawa operation.

We departed Ulithi for the Okinawa landings on the 21st of March, arrived at Okinawa the 24th of March, and performed screening duties with the battleships and cruisers [protecting them from Japanese aircraft and submarines] who were bombarding the beaches until the major landing on April 1st, 1945. Thereafter, we took up station to the north of Okinawa at radar picket station number one about 35 miles north of Okinawa [these picket stations gave advance warning of the approach of enemy aircraft or ships].

Our tour of duty on this picket station was uneventful until the morning of April 16th, when we underwent a concentrated attack by Japanese suicide planes. The attack commenced about 8:27 [a.m.] when we were attacked by four Vals [single-engine Japanese Aichi D3A naval dive bomber with a 2-man crew], which split, two heading for our bow and two swinging around to attack us from the stern. We shot down three of these and combined with a nearby LCS [support landing craft] in splashing the fourth one. Then two other planes came in from either bow, both of which were shot down by us. It was about the seventh plane that we were firing on that finally crashed into us amidships and started a huge fire. This marked us as a cripple with the flames and smoke billowing up from the ship and the Japs really went to work on us after that.

Two planes came in quick succession from astern and crashed into our after [rear of the ship] five-inch twin mount. The first one carried a bomb which exploded on deck. The second one dropped its bomb on deck before crashing into the after mount. Shortly thereafter, two more planes came in on the port quarter crashing into the deckhouse just forward of the crippled after five-inch mount. This sent a flood of gasoline into the two compartments below the after crew’s head [bathroom] and with the fire that was already raging in the after crew’s compartment just aft of the five-inch mount number three, we now had fires going in all of the after three living spaces, besides the big fire topside in the vicinity of the number four 40 mm [antiaircraft gun] mount.

The two planes… no, the next one was a plane from our port quarter that dropped a bomb just about our port [left] propeller and jammed our rudder [steering mechanism] when it was 26 degrees left.

Strafed by Approaching Plane.

The next plane came from the port bow, knocked off our yardarm [a horizontally-mounted spar on the radar/radio mast], and a [F4U] Corsair [single engine US fighter with a 1-man crew] chasing it, knocked off our Sugar Charlie [SC air search] radar. Then a plane came in from the port bow carrying a big bomb and was shot down close aboard [in the water near the ship’s side]. A large bomb fragment from the exploding bomb knocked out the power in our number two five- inch mount which is the one just forward of the bridge. Shortly thereafter this mount, in manual control, knocked down an Oscar [single-engine Japanese Nakajima Ki-43, Army-type fighter with a 1-man crew] coming in on our starboard bow [from the right-front of the ship] when it was about 500 yards from the ship. At the same time the alert mount captain of number one five- inch mount sighted a Val diving on the ship from the starboard bow, took it under fire and knocked it down about 500 yards from the ship using Victor Tare projectiles. The next plane came yardarm as it pulled out of its dive. It was shot down by the Corsairs ahead of the ship.

The next plane came in from the starboard bow strafing [firing its machine guns] as it approached and dropped a bomb just below the bridge which wiped out our two 20 mms [antiaircraft guns] in that area and killed some of the people in the wardroom [officers’ dining and social compartment] battle dressing station. This plane did not try to crash either, and was shot down, after passing over the ship, by our fighter cover.

The last plane that attacked the ship came in from the port bow, and was shot down by the combined fire of the Corsair pilots and our own machine guns, and struck the water close aboard and skidded into the side of the ship, denting the ship’s side but causing no damage.

The action had lasted an hour and 20 minutes. We had been attacked by 22 planes, nine of which we had shot down unassisted, eight planes had struck the ship, seven of them with suicidal intent, two of these seven did practically no damage other than knocking off yardarms. Five of these seven did really heavy material damage and killed a lot of our personnel. We had only four of our original eleven .20 mm mounts still in commission. Eight of the original 12 barrels of our .40 mm mounts could still shoot but only in local control, all electrical power to them being gone and our after five-inch mount was completely destroyed. Our engines were still intact.

The fires were still out of control and we were slowly flooding aft. Our rudder was still jammed and remained jammed until we reached port. We tried every engine combination possible to try to make a little headway to the southward but all no avail. We had lost 33 men, killed or missing, about 60 others had been wounded and approximately 30 of these were seriously wounded.

The morning of our attack off Okinawa we had a CAP [combat air patrol] of about 10 planes over us. It was entirely inadequate for the number of attacking Jap planes. Our own radar operators said that they saw as many as 50 bogies [Japanese aircraft] approaching the ship from the north just prior to the attack. Many more planes were undoubtedly sent to our assistance and quite a large number of Jap planes were undoubtedly shot down outside of our own gun range and to the north of us that morning. When the attack was all over we had a CAP of 24 planes protecting us.

Threw live bomb over the side.

One of the highlights of the action occurred when Lieutenant T.W. Runk, [spelled] R-U-N-K, USNR, who was the Communications Officer on the Laffey at the time, went aft to try to free the rudder. He had to clear his way through debris and plane wreckage to reach the fantail [rearmost deck on the ship] and, on his way back to the steering engine room, saw an unexploded bomb on deck which he promptly tossed over the side. His example of courage and daring was one of the most inspiring ones on the Laffey that morning.

Another example of resourcefulness exhibited that morning came when two of the engineers, who were fighting fires in one of the after compartments, were finally driven by the heat of the planes [flames] into the after Diesel generator room. The heat from the burning gasoline scorched the paint on the inside of the Diesel generator room where there was no ventilation whatsoever. The acrid fumes almost suffocated these two men but they called the officer in charge of the after engine room, which was in adjacent compartment, and told him of their predicament. He immediately had one of the men beat a hole through the bulkhead with a hammer and chisel and then, with and electric drill, cut a larger hole to put an air hose through to give them sufficient air until they could be rescued. At the same time other engineering personnel had cleared away the plane wreckage on the topside and with an oxime acetylene torch cut a hole through the deck which enabled these two men to escape. Upon reaching the topside, both of them turned to fighting the fires in the after part of the ship.

The morning after the action we removed one engine from the inside of the after five-inch mount which had been completely destroyed and which had had its port side completely blown off by the explosion of the initial plane, which was carrying a bomb when it crashed into this mount. The second plane which crashed into that mount had also done great damage to it. And the next morning we pulled one engine out of the inside of the mount and another engine was sitting beside the mount with the remains of the little Jap pilot just aft of the engine. There was very little left of him, however.

We transferred our injured personnel to a smaller ship that afternoon, which took them immediately to Okinawa. We were taken in tow by a light mine-sweeper in the early afternoon, about three hours after the attack and the mine-sweeper turned the tow over a short time later to a tug, which had been sent to our rescue. Another tug came alongside us to assist in pumping out our flooded spaces and with one tug towing us and the other alongside pumping us, we reached Okinawa early the next morning.

Put soft patches on hull.

After reaching Okinawa and pumping out all our flooded spaces, we put soft patches on four small holes we found in the underwater body in the after part of the ship. It took about five days to patch the ship up sufficiently for it to start the journey back to Pearl Harbor.

After leaving Okinawa we proceeded to Saipan and thence to Eniwetok and from Eniwetok on to Pearl Harbor.

About the seventh plane that attacked us, it came in on the port bow and he was low on the water and I kept on turning with about 25 degrees left rudder towards him to try to keep him on the beam. He swung back towards our stern and then cut in directly towards our stern and then cut in directly towards the ship. I kept turning to port to try to keep him on the beam and concentrate the maximum gunfire on him and as we turned, we could see him skidding farther aft all the time. I finally saw that he wouldn’t quite make [it to hit] the bridge but then I was afraid he was going to strike the hull in the vicinity of the engine room, but about a hundred yards out from the ship, he finally straightened out and went over the fantail nicking the edge of five-inch mount three and then crashed into the water beyond the ship.

Of course, many people have various ideas about how to avoid these Kamikazes but the consensus of opinion, so far as I know, to try to keep them on the beam [i.e., coming in on a 90- degree angle to the long axis of the ship, or directly from the side] as much as possible or one reason to concentrate the maximum gunfire on them as they approached. And another reason is to give them less danger space by exposing just the beam of the ship rather than the quarter of the bow for them to attack from. The danger space is much less if they come in from the beam than it would be if they came in from ahead or from astern and had the whole length of the ship to choose in which to crash into. High speed and the twin rudders, with which 2200 ton destroyers are equipped, were believed to have been vital factors in saving our ship that morning off Okinawa.

Interviewer:

Captain Becton, were you on some other destroyer in the early part of the war?

Commander Becton:

Yes, I was in the [USS] Aaron Ward [DD-483] in the early part of the war. I was in the [USS] Gleaves [DD-423] when the war was first declared, but went to the Aaron Ward a short time after that as Chief Engineer, fleeted up [was promoted] to Exec[utive Officer – second in command] and was in there when she went through that night action off Guadalcanal the night of 12-13 November 1942. We were hit by nine shells that night, varying between 5 and 14 inches, but fortunately they were all well above the water line. We were towed into Tulagi [an island near Guadalcanal] the next day and later repaired.

Interviewer:

Were you also on board when the Ward went down?

Commander Becton:

Yes, I was on board the Aaron Ward when she sank off Guadalcanal in April, 1943. After that I went to the squadron staff of ComDesRon [Commander, Destroyer Squadron] 21 and went through three surface actions in the [USS] Nicholas [DD-449]. The first of these was the night of 6 July, in the First Battle of Kolombangara or Kula Gulf when the [light cruiser USS] Helena [CL-50] was sunk. The Nicholas and the [destroyer USS] Radford [DD-446] stayed behind after the cruisers and other destroyers retired to pick up the Helena‘s survivors and fight a surface action with Jap ships that were still there in Kula Gulf.

The next surface action we were in came a week later when the same outfit of destroyers and cruisers attacked some more Jap cruisers and destroyers that were coming down from the northwest. We operated under Admiral Ainesworth that night. The destroyers were under the overall command of Captain McInerney.

After that the next surface action we were in was after the occupation of Vella Lavella, in which we took on some Jap destroyers and barges [towed craft carrying troops or cargo] to the north of Vella Lavella in a night action. The destroyers turned and ran and left their barges and we couldn’t catch the destroyers. We did some damage to them, possibly destroyed some, but the major damage was done to the barges which they had left behind and many of which we sank.

Note: USS Laffey survived WWII and is now a memorial ship which can be visited at Patriots Point Naval & Maritime Museum in Mount Pleasan

Action at Okinawa    The Seizure of Okinawa was a long and costly operation. Merchant ships went to this island in great numbers from April to June, 1945 in order to bring the bombs, gasoline, and thousands of other items needed to consolidate the conquest of this outpost on the direct road to Tokyo. Many of these vessels were Victory ships, a much finer and faster ship than the slow Liberty. The action at Okinawa differed somewhat from that in the Philippines in that the whole emphasis was on concealing merchant ships by smoke. Armed Guards who had been highly trained in local control firing and who had been trained in many previous actions were now ordered not to fire at enemy planes unless direct attacked or unless their ships were not adequately covered by smoke. This wise procedure undoubtedly saved many ships. Nothing marks a ship out clearer as a target than tracer fire on a dark night. Armed Guards in the European theater and in the Pacific were quick to observe that their ships often escaped detection by the enemy when they did not fire. Another reason why unrestrained firing was discouraged at Okinawa was the elaborate air coverage which was supplied. Merchant ships risked shooting down our own planes. All in all the Okinawa campaign was a very trying experience for Armed Guards. They spent long hours at general quarters, endured the constant strain of having the enemy attacking close by, and were able to do little but wait for the enemy which came too close or for that moment when the protective curtain of smoke was swept away by the wind. It has seemed proper in this account to deal only with the significant actions of the Armed Guards at Okinawa. With so many ships involved, it hardly appears practical to record every remote contact with the enemy. This chapter describes damage done to merchant ships and damage done to enemy planes by the guns of merchant ships. It makes no attempt to list all ships which went to Okinawa and which fired at enemy planes.

The first merchant ships in the Okinawa area arrived at Kerama Retto on April 6, 1945. These ships were the Pierre Victory, the Logan Victory, the Hobbs Victory, the Halaula Victory, and the Green Bay Victory. Enemy planes heavily attacked the first three ships, which were loaded with ammunition, and an LST, all of which were in the outer anchorage on April 6. First a plane crashed into the LST at about 1620. The next ship to be hit by a suicide plane was the Logan Victory at about 1647. The Logan Victory had already shot down one plane and assisted in destroying another. The kamikaze hit just aft of her deck house on the port side at the boat deck level. A large explosion followed and flames spread rapidly. Wooden deck houses added to the intensity of the flames. Many acts of heroism followed. One Armed Guard was killed and two were missing. Wounded Armed Guards and other Naval personnel injured number nine. The ship was abandoned. The Hobbs Victory assisted in the destruction of a plane which crashed about 100 yards from the Pierre Victory at 1640, but at 1945 a plane crashed into the ship just forward of amidships at boat deck level. There was a large explosion and flames quickly covered the deck. Armed Guards and other Navy personnel killed numbered two, and two Armed Guards were wounded. Merchant crewmen killed or missing numbered thirteen, and another merchant crewman was wounded. The ship was abandoned. The Pierre Victory scored three assists against enemy planes and survived to arrive at Okinawa on April 11. Her only close call came on April 27 when artillery shells landed within 100 yards. The Green Bay Victory and the Halaula Victory escaped damage inside the harbor. The former was credited with one plane downed and one assist. On April 14 at Nago Wan, shells from shore based artillery fell around the ship.

Some 15 additional merchant ships defended by Armed Guards arrived at Okinawa on April 11. One of these, the Minot Victory, brought down a plane on April 12 which strafed the ship and crashed into her No. 4 kingpost. Five Armed Guards were wounded. Between April 11 and 20 the United Victoryclaimed the destruction of one enemy bomber and the probable destruction of two enemy fighters. This action took place on April 15. The Afoundria claimed assists on April 12 and 15, and was credited with an assist on the latter date. The Dashing Wave was under fire from shore batteries on April 14 but escaped damage. The Saginaw Victory was credited with the destruction of one enemy plane on April 12 and another on April 15. Bombs landed about 300 yards away on the latter date, and the ship was strafed. The Flagstaff Victory reported ineffective fire from shore batteries, and was officially credited with two assists against enemy planes on April 12. She reported 56 air alerts, mostly at night, between April 11 and May 4. According to the Sioux Falls Victory, there were air raids throughout April except for April 24 and 25. Suicide boats also entered the anchorage on at least two occasions and hit a ship on April 26. Enemy shelling was not the only menace; a number of times the Sioux Falls Victory was showered with shell fragments from our own anti-aircraft fire. An Armed Guard was wounded by a fragment or by an unexploded 20mm shell on April 28. This ship claimed the probable destruction of one plane on April 15. The Brigham Victory fired at a plane which passed directly over her stern on April 12 and then burst into flames. Many ships were firing, and it is impossible to assign definite credit in such cases. Other ships which fired during the early days of the invasion without any definite credit for destruction of enemy planes were the Cape Georgia, the Claremont Victory, the Whirlwind, the Silverbow Victory, and the Sea Runner. The latter ship made two trips to the Okinawa area in April and May. Two ships, the Morning Light and the Czechoslovakia Victory reported no action at Okinawa from April 11 to 26.

After the initial convoys, ships came to Okinawa in rapid succession. Most of these merchant vessels had some contact with the enemy. But the fighting for the Armed Guards was not as tough as that in the early stages for the invasion of the Philippines. The Michael Pupin established an enviable record by downing one plane, probably destroying another, and assisting in the destruction of three planes between April 14 and June 19. She was at Okinawa much longer than the average merchant vessel. On May 26 a bomb fell only 25 to 40 feet away from the ship. The Kelso Victory reported that enemy torpedo boats and swimmers were active but than none attacked her. The William R. Davie had the interesting experience of being at both the western and eastern sides of Okinawa. Japanese attacks were normally much heavier at Hagushi than at Nakagusuki Wan on the eastern side. While anchored to the west, the Davie Armed Guard officer reported a suicide attack by small craft or two-man submarines on April 26 which damaged one ship. The Davie brought down a plane on the same day. On May 4, two days after she changed anchorages, the Davie became involved in another attack by Japanese small craft. She fired at an object resembling a small submarine. Perhaps the action which gave the Armed Guards the most satisfaction was the attack by a Japanese suicide pilot on some rocks jutting out of the sea. The pilot apparently took these rocks to be a large ship, and crashed his plane into them on May 9.

A serious loss was the sinking of the Canada Victory on April 27. A plane crashed into the ship and dropped into the number 5 hold. An explosion blew out the side of the ship and it sank in seven minutes. Two Armed Guards were killed and twelve were wounded. On the same day, a shell landed only 15 yards from Clarksdale Victory and threw fragments on the deck. One lifeboat was damaged.

At less than two hours past midnight on the morning of May 4, the Paducah Victory was approached by a Japanese suicide boat which slipped alongside and then headed away at high speed as the Armed Guards fired. Later that morning her Armed Guards witnessed a kamikaze crash into the cruiserBirmingham. The Henry J. Raymond may have scored hits on this airplane. The Sea Flasher also claimed hits on this plane.

On May 13, patrol boats once again fired at the “skunk boats” as the Japanese suicide boats were called. Phosphorous bombs fell on either side of the Henry J. Raymond on May 9 and an anti-personnel bomb landed on her deck on May 24, wounding the purser. The Henry L. Gantt had shell fragments land on her deck on May 4, while the Laredo Victory was either hit by a small bomb or by shell fire. Two of her Armed Guards were wounded. According to the Henry L. Gantt Armed Guard officer, there were over 300 raids between May 3 and June 6, and well over 2,000 planes over the area during this period. He also observed that few ships suffered damage while covered by smoke, and that these few were only attacked after they opened fire.

Many ships which arrived in the May 3 convoy had little or no action. The Anniston Victory had bombs fall moderately close only twice in May. On May 4, shell fragments hit the chief mate on the Ames Victory. This ship claimed hits on the plane which crashed into the Birmingham. The J.S. Hutchinson claimed hits on one of four planes observed on May 4. One military passenger was wounded when shell fragments and a 20mm projectile struck the J. Maurice Thompson on May 4. Shell fragments also landed on this ship on May 6 and 9. One merchant seaman on the El Reno Victory was wounded by a shell fragment on May 12.

The Harvard Victory, which arrived on May 4 and departed on May 27, described the effectiveness of the anti-aircraft protection around Okinawa. Only fourteen times during this crucial period were planes able to break through the outside patrol and damage ships and shore installations. This Armed Guard officer believed that his ship hit one Japanese plane. Only once did a phosphorous bomb fall close.

But all merchant ships were not able to escape the blows of a ruthless enemy who was quite willing to give his life to achieve limited damage. On May 11, the Tjisadane was struck by a plane which she had already hit and set afire. The plane struck the booms of No. 2 hold and disintegrated, throwing wreckage and flaming gasoline over the forward deck and on the bridge. This plane had previously launched a torpedo which passed astern of the Tjisadane and under the Panamint. The Tjisadane shot down another plane, brought her fire under control, and left the area under her own power. Four Army and Navy personnel were killed and nine were wounded.

Three merchant ships fell victims to kamikazes on May 28. These ships, the Josiah Snelling, the Mary A. Livermore, and the Brown Victory were badly damaged but survived. The Livermore was hit on the starboard side of her bridge at 0525. Her losses were heavy, including seven merchant crewmen killed, three Armed Guards killed, four merchant crewmen wounded, and three Armed Guards wounded. But her Armed Guards continued to fight in the best tradition of the Navy and claimed a plane shot down and one or two more hit before the morning was over. The Josiah Snelling was credited with two planes and an assist and probably assisted in bringing down another. Just after 0800 a plane struck her in the No. 1 hold and sent flames upward as high as the masthead. Wounded personnel aboard the ship numbered eleven, of which three were Armed Guards. One the same day, the Brown Victory at Ie Shima was hit by a suicide plane, with two Armed Guards killed and nine wounded. Earlier, on May 25, the William B. Allison had been hit by an aerial torpedo while anchored at Nakagsuku Wan. There were no Armed Guard casualties, but one Navy man was killed, six merchant crewmen died and two were wounded. TheAllison assisted in shooting down a plane the same morning.

Many ships were present when these attacks took place and claimed a part in bringing down enemy planes. The Sea Partridge claimed that she assisted in bringing down the plane which struck the Tjisadane on May 11. The C.W. Post, which earlier had been saved from damage by the discovery of five enemy swimmers in the vicinity of the ship, also fired at the plane which hit the Tjisadane. The Ethiopia Victory may have it the plane which crashed into the battleship New Mexico on May 12. The Jubal A. Early was credited with an assist against another plane which missed the New Mexico. The Early suffered casualties on May 24 when a 20mm projectile struck her No. 4 gun tub and exploded. Two Armed Guards and a merchant seaman were wounded.

On the other hand, the Armed Guards aboard the Kota Agoeng would have insisted that Nakagusuku Wan was still a rather dangerous place. When this ship arrived on May 27, four to six bombs, all near misses, welcomed her to Okinawa. She claimed direct hits on three planes on May 28. One June 3, a stray shell fragment from a strafing plane wounded an Army private. The crew of the Dutch-flagged vessel manned one 37mm gun, while the Armed Guards manned the other, claiming credit for two and one-half planes (this is presumed to mean two planes and an assist). The Berea Victory was credited with three assists on May 28. She reported that bombs fell on two occasions, but they were not very close.

By the end of May, the worst of the fighting at Okinawa was over for merchant ships, but there was still some action. The reduction in peril to merchant ships is probably best attributed to the excellent fighter screen created by Marine Corps pilots. From May 22 to July 12, according to the William H. Dale, there were 86 alerts, but planes only came near Hagushi only some 20 times. These figures testify to the efficiency of the fighter screen.

On June 3 the Cape Bon fired at a plane which fell into the water near another ship. It is impossible to assign definite credit in such cases. The Norman Hapgood was credited with an assist on June 11. After assisting in the destruction of a plane on June 3, the Walter Colton had a narrow escape on June 11 when a plane missed her bridge by only a few feet. Water, gasoline, and debris were thrown over the decks. Shell fragments injured several “Seabees” and one passenger had his helmet knocked off by a .50 caliber bullet. The Belle of the West had four fragmentation bombs fall 100 yards from her bow on June 17 and was showered by bomb fragments. On June 16 shell fragments landed around the George E. Waldo, but she did not fire her guns during 44 air alerts. Many other ships had little or no actual action with the enemy and are not even mentioned in this account.

While the Armed Guard reports for the latter part of June and the first part of July indicated either no direct contact or, at most, firing on one or two occasions, alerts were still frequent and some warships were being hit. One of the last reports to indicate bombs falling in the vicinity of merchant ships was that ofPeter Lassen for June 30. The William T. Sherman also reported that bombs fell close to the ship on several occasions, but did not report exact dates. Taken together, all these reports mean that the back of Japanese air power had been definitely broken. Japan was no longer able to defend even such a vital key to her homeland as Okinawa. That merchant ships were able to come through such a campaign with so little damage and to inflict so much damage on enemy planes was due in no small degree to the Armed Guard service. Here was the final fruit of the long years of developing Armed Guards. No finer group of fighting men ever sailed on any ships than those who had come through so many campaigns and were now participating in their last battles before the end of hostilities.

A Visual Story: By Joshua L. Wick, Naval History and Heritage Command, Communication and Outreach Division

Editor’s Note: The following photos tell just a brief story of the U.S. Navy’s involvement during theOkinawa Invasion and Battle of Okinawa. One of the unique items NHHC has in its archives is an oral history of Cmdr. Frederick J. Becton, commanding officer of destroyer USS Laffey (DD-724), which saw action during the Okinawa operations.  All the photos below are courtesy of NHHC’s Photo Archives, the Navy Art Collection and the National Archives.

On April 1, 1945, under heavy naval gunfire and aircraft support, U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps troops began the invasion of Okinawa, the last major amphibious assault of World War II. For Japan, the island was the barrier to a direct invasion of its homeland, while to the Allies, once the island was in their control, it would clear the path for the final invasion of Japan. When the island was finally declared secure on June 21, after 82 days of battle, the campaign ended up being the largest and one of the most costly battles in the Pacific.

The invasion and ultimate seizure of Okinawa was not an easy operation, in fact it was a significantly costly operation. From April – June 1945, U.S. Navy merchant ships went to this island in great numbers with the intent of bringing much needed supplies — bombs, gasoline, and more, to consolidate the operational needs of this outpost on the direct road to Tokyo.

The operation, under the strategic command of Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, began with 5th Fleet air strikes against Kyushu on March 18, 1945, and initial landings on Okinawa itself on Easter Sunday, April 1, 1945. An enormous assemblage of ships participated in the operation, during which 36 of them of destroyer size or smaller were lost, most to the heaviest concentration of kamikaze attacks of the war.

Okinawa Invasion, 1945. USS LSM 85, off Okinawa, during the landings there circa 1 April 1945. 80-G-K-4922 (Color).

Almost 8,000 enemy aircraft were destroyed in the air or on the ground.

As April 7 rolled around, the last remnants of the Japanese Navy were met by overwhelming Navy airpower. Japanese battleship Yamato, a cruiser, and four destroyers were sunk in the one-day battle. Once U.S. Joint Forces secured Okinawa, the supply lanes of the East China Sea were blocked, isolating all southern possessions which were still in Japanese hands … the last obstacle in the path to the Japanese Home Islands was finally cleared.

For A Deeper Dive

Action at Okinawa    The Seizure of Okinawa was a long and costly operation. Merchant ships went to this island in great numbers from April to June, 1945 in order to bring the bombs, gasoline, and thousands of other items needed to consolidate the conquest of this outpost on the direct road to Tokyo. Many of these vessels were Victory ships, a much finer and faster ship than the slow Liberty. The action at Okinawa differed somewhat from that in the Philippines in that the whole emphasis was on concealing merchant ships by smoke. Armed Guards who had been highly trained in local control firing and who had been trained in many previous actions were now ordered not to fire at enemy planes unless direct attacked or unless their ships were not adequately covered by smoke. This wise procedure undoubtedly saved many ships. Nothing marks a ship out clearer as a target than tracer fire on a dark night. Armed Guards in the European theater and in the Pacific were quick to observe that their ships often escaped detection by the enemy when they did not fire. Another reason why unrestrained firing was discouraged at Okinawa was the elaborate air coverage which was supplied. Merchant ships risked shooting down our own planes. All in all the Okinawa campaign was a very trying experience for Armed Guards. They spent long hours at general quarters, endured the constant strain of having the enemy attacking close by, and were able to do little but wait for the enemy which came too close or for that moment when the protective curtain of smoke was swept away by the wind. It has seemed proper in this account to deal only with the significant actions of the Armed Guards at Okinawa. With so many ships involved, it hardly appears practical to record every remote contact with the enemy. This chapter describes damage done to merchant ships and damage done to enemy planes by the guns of merchant ships. It makes no attempt to list all ships which went to Okinawa and which fired at enemy planes.

The first merchant ships in the Okinawa area arrived at Kerama Retto on April 6, 1945. These ships were the Pierre Victory, the Logan Victory, the Hobbs Victory, the Halaula Victory, and the Green Bay Victory. Enemy planes heavily attacked the first three ships, which were loaded with ammunition, and an LST, all of which were in the outer anchorage on April 6. First a plane crashed into the LST at about 1620. The next ship to be hit by a suicide plane was the Logan Victory at about 1647. The Logan Victory had already shot down one plane and assisted in destroying another. The kamikaze hit just aft of her deck house on the port side at the boat deck level. A large explosion followed and flames spread rapidly. Wooden deck houses added to the intensity of the flames. Many acts of heroism followed. One Armed Guard was killed and two were missing. Wounded Armed Guards and other Naval personnel injured number nine. The ship was abandoned. The Hobbs Victory assisted in the destruction of a plane which crashed about 100 yards from the Pierre Victory at 1640, but at 1945 a plane crashed into the ship just forward of amidships at boat deck level. There was a large explosion and flames quickly covered the deck. Armed Guards and other Navy personnel killed numbered two, and two Armed Guards were wounded. Merchant crewmen killed or missing numbered thirteen, and another merchant crewman was wounded. The ship was abandoned. The Pierre Victory scored three assists against enemy planes and survived to arrive at Okinawa on April 11. Her only close call came on April 27 when artillery shells landed within 100 yards. The Green Bay Victory and the Halaula Victory escaped damage inside the harbor. The former was credited with one plane downed and one assist. On April 14 at Nago Wan, shells from shore based artillery fell around the ship.

Some 15 additional merchant ships defended by Armed Guards arrived at Okinawa on April 11. One of these, the Minot Victory, brought down a plane on April 12 which strafed the ship and crashed into her No. 4 kingpost. Five Armed Guards were wounded. Between April 11 and 20 the United Victoryclaimed the destruction of one enemy bomber and the probable destruction of two enemy fighters. This action took place on April 15. The Afoundria claimed assists on April 12 and 15, and was credited with an assist on the latter date. The Dashing Wave was under fire from shore batteries on April 14 but escaped damage. The Saginaw Victory was credited with the destruction of one enemy plane on April 12 and another on April 15. Bombs landed about 300 yards away on the latter date, and the ship was strafed. The Flagstaff Victory reported ineffective fire from shore batteries, and was officially credited with two assists against enemy planes on April 12. She reported 56 air alerts, mostly at night, between April 11 and May 4. According to the Sioux Falls Victory, there were air raids throughout April except for April 24 and 25. Suicide boats also entered the anchorage on at least two occasions and hit a ship on April 26. Enemy shelling was not the only menace; a number of times the Sioux Falls Victory was showered with shell fragments from our own anti-aircraft fire. An Armed Guard was wounded by a fragment or by an unexploded 20mm shell on April 28. This ship claimed the probable destruction of one plane on April 15. The Brigham Victory fired at a plane which passed directly over her stern on April 12 and then burst into flames. Many ships were firing, and it is impossible to assign definite credit in such cases. Other ships which fired during the early days of the invasion without any definite credit for destruction of enemy planes were the Cape Georgia, the Claremont Victory, the Whirlwind, the Silverbow Victory, and the Sea Runner. The latter ship made two trips to the Okinawa area in April and May. Two ships, the Morning Light and the Czechoslovakia Victory reported no action at Okinawa from April 11 to 26.

After the initial convoys, ships came to Okinawa in rapid succession. Most of these merchant vessels had some contact with the enemy. But the fighting for the Armed Guards was not as tough as that in the early stages for the invasion of the Philippines. The Michael Pupin established an enviable record by downing one plane, probably destroying another, and assisting in the destruction of three planes between April 14 and June 19. She was at Okinawa much longer than the average merchant vessel. On May 26 a bomb fell only 25 to 40 feet away from the ship. The Kelso Victory reported that enemy torpedo boats and swimmers were active but than none attacked her. The William R. Davie had the interesting experience of being at both the western and eastern sides of Okinawa. Japanese attacks were normally much heavier at Hagushi than at Nakagusuki Wan on the eastern side. While anchored to the west, the Davie Armed Guard officer reported a suicide attack by small craft or two-man submarines on April 26 which damaged one ship. The Davie brought down a plane on the same day. On May 4, two days after she changed anchorages, the Davie became involved in another attack by Japanese small craft. She fired at an object resembling a small submarine. Perhaps the action which gave the Armed Guards the most satisfaction was the attack by a Japanese suicide pilot on some rocks jutting out of the sea. The pilot apparently took these rocks to be a large ship, and crashed his plane into them on May 9.

The Mariscal Sucre was in bombardments by enemy artillery on April 27 and 29, and reported 205 air raids, in addition to a suicide boat attack on May 4. Two phosphorous bombs landed close to the Rockland Victory during her stay at Okinawa from April 26 to May 15. The Virginia City Victory reported considerable losses in navy ships as a result of the suicide boat attack of May 4 and indicated that a plane hit a cruiser on the same day.

A serious loss was the sinking of the Canada Victory on April 27. A plane crashed into the ship and dropped into the number 5 hold. An explosion blew out the side of the ship and it sank in seven minutes. Two Armed Guards were killed and twelve were wounded. On the same day, a shell landed only 15 yards from Clarksdale Victory and threw fragments on the deck. One lifeboat was damaged.

The Moline Victory was at Okinawa and nearby Ie Shima in May. She downed one plane and assisted in destroying another. This action took place at Ie Shima on May 18 and 20. While there her Armed Guards witnessed the torpedoing of an LST and a suicide dive by a Japanese plane on the damaged naval craft.

The Clearwater Victory assisted in destroying a plane on May 6 and another on May 11. Like so many ships at Okinawa, she was present when a Japanese plane crashed into the battleship New Mexico on May 12. The Clearwater Victory was hit by stray anti-aircraft fire and by shell fragments. The Robert M. La Follette also reported shell fragments on her deck on May 13, mute testimony to the tremendous amount of flak which was sent into the sky around Okinawa.

At less than two hours past midnight on the morning of May 4, the Paducah Victory was approached by a Japanese suicide boat which slipped alongside and then headed away at high speed as the Armed Guards fired. Later that morning her Armed Guards witnessed a kamikaze crash into the cruiserBirmingham. The Henry J. Raymond may have scored hits on this airplane. The Sea Flasher also claimed hits on this plane.

On May 13, patrol boats once again fired at the “skunk boats” as the Japanese suicide boats were called. Phosphorous bombs fell on either side of the Henry J. Raymond on May 9 and an anti-personnel bomb landed on her deck on May 24, wounding the purser. The Henry L. Gantt had shell fragments land on her deck on May 4, while the Laredo Victory was either hit by a small bomb or by shell fire. Two of her Armed Guards were wounded. According to the Henry L. Gantt Armed Guard officer, there were over 300 raids between May 3 and June 6, and well over 2,000 planes over the area during this period. He also observed that few ships suffered damage while covered by smoke, and that these few were only attacked after they opened fire.

Many ships which arrived in the May 3 convoy had little or no action. The Anniston Victory had bombs fall moderately close only twice in May. On May 4, shell fragments hit the chief mate on the Ames Victory. This ship claimed hits on the plane which crashed into the Birmingham. The J.S. Hutchinson claimed hits on one of four planes observed on May 4. One military passenger was wounded when shell fragments and a 20mm projectile struck the J. Maurice Thompson on May 4. Shell fragments also landed on this ship on May 6 and 9. One merchant seaman on the El Reno Victory was wounded by a shell fragment on May 12.

The Harvard Victory, which arrived on May 4 and departed on May 27, described the effectiveness of the anti-aircraft protection around Okinawa. Only fourteen times during this crucial period were planes able to break through the outside patrol and damage ships and shore installations. This Armed Guard officer believed that his ship hit one Japanese plane. Only once did a phosphorous bomb fall close.

But all merchant ships were not able to escape the blows of a ruthless enemy who was quite willing to give his life to achieve limited damage. On May 11, the Tjisadane was struck by a plane which she had already hit and set afire. The plane struck the booms of No. 2 hold and disintegrated, throwing wreckage and flaming gasoline over the forward deck and on the bridge. This plane had previously launched a torpedo which passed astern of the Tjisadane and under the Panamint. The Tjisadane shot down another plane, brought her fire under control, and left the area under her own power. Four Army and Navy personnel were killed and nine were wounded.

Three merchant ships fell victims to kamikazes on May 28. These ships, the Josiah Snelling, the Mary A. Livermore, and the Brown Victory were badly damaged but survived. The Livermore was hit on the starboard side of her bridge at 0525. Her losses were heavy, including seven merchant crewmen killed, three Armed Guards killed, four merchant crewmen wounded, and three Armed Guards wounded. But her Armed Guards continued to fight in the best tradition of the Navy and claimed a plane shot down and one or two more hit before the morning was over. The Josiah Snelling was credited with two planes and an assist and probably assisted in bringing down another. Just after 0800 a plane struck her in the No. 1 hold and sent flames upward as high as the masthead. Wounded personnel aboard the ship numbered eleven, of which three were Armed Guards. One the same day, the Brown Victory at Ie Shima was hit by a suicide plane, with two Armed Guards killed and nine wounded. Earlier, on May 25, the William B. Allison had been hit by an aerial torpedo while anchored at Nakagsuku Wan. There were no Armed Guard casualties, but one Navy man was killed, six merchant crewmen died and two were wounded. TheAllison assisted in shooting down a plane the same morning.

Many ships were present when these attacks took place and claimed a part in bringing down enemy planes. The Sea Partridge claimed that she assisted in bringing down the plane which struck the Tjisadane on May 11. The C.W. Post, which earlier had been saved from damage by the discovery of five enemy swimmers in the vicinity of the ship, also fired at the plane which hit the Tjisadane. The Ethiopia Victory may have it the plane which crashed into the battleship New Mexico on May 12. The Jubal A. Early was credited with an assist against another plane which missed the New Mexico. The Early suffered casualties on May 24 when a 20mm projectile struck her No. 4 gun tub and exploded. Two Armed Guards and a merchant seaman were wounded.

The Clark Howell claimed an assist on May 25 in shooting down a plane which crashed about 10 feet from the starboard side of the ship by the No. 4 hatch. There were no casualties. On May 28 she claimed three assists. One of these planes crashed into a Liberty. The John Owen assisted in the destruction of a plane which dropped two bombs on the disabled Allison. The Donald MacCleary claimed credit for an assist in downing a plane at Ie Shima on May 20. The Norman J. Colman scored an assist in the destruction of a plane on May 28. She had also fired on May 25 and had shell fragments land on her deck that same day.

The Segundo Ruiz-Belvis was missed by a plane by only about 100 yards on May 25. The plane exploded and littered the decks with debris. Shell fragments also landed aboard. At 0905 on the same day, Ruiz-Belvis assisted in downing a plane which landed about 150 yards from her side. She and Dartmouth Victory claimed assists against the plane which hit the Brown Victory at Ie Shima on May 26. The Charles M.Conrad claimed an assist against the plane which hit the Snelling. The Jean La Fitte was credited with an assist on May 27 and three more on May 28. A claim for a fifth assist was not credited. TheClovis Victory destroyed two planes and assisted in the destruction of three other planes on May 28. The Cape Alexander was credited with an assist on May 28. She also claimed hits on two other planes that same day, as well as a third aircraft on May 25 and a fourth attacker on June 11. All of these planes crashed into the sea except for the one which it the Snelling. The Uriah M. Rose brought down a plane on May 18 which missed her by about 50 feet. She shot down one plane and assisted in destroying another on May 28. Rose was also credited with the destruction of one plane on June 3 and another on June 11.

The Kota Inten assisted in bringing down a plane on the afternoon of May 20 at Ie Shima, and in seven minutes shot down another. The latter landed not more than 40 or 50 yards from the Inten. Parts of the plane and pilot, as well as oil and water, were scattered over the ship from bow to stern. Within five minutes, the ship probably destroyed another plane. On May 21, she shot down a plane that had friendly markings but behaved in a hostile manner. There was doubt as to the identity of the aircraft.

The Cornelius Vanderbilt claimed destruction of five planes at Ie Shima on May 18 and 20 and received confirmation of four of these. Three planes dived at the ship on May 18, and her Armed Guards shot down all three. A near miss from a bomb late on this date caused small fires. When two suicide planes dived at the ship on May 20, she again brought both of them down. This was big league shooting.

The Stanley Matthews at Hagushi, Okinawa was credited with assists on June 3 and 11. On the former date, a bomb missed the ship by only 30 feet and a nearby ship hit her with a 40mm projectile. The Sea Quail claimed two assists at Ie Shima on May 20. The Cape Douglas was credited with assists on May 21 and 27. In the latter part of May and the first part of June, the Greeneville Victory found Nakagusuku Wan in eastern Okinawa a rather quite place as compared with Hagushi in western Okinawa. She fired only twice, and one of her targets was quickly discovered to be an American plane.

On the other hand, the Armed Guards aboard the Kota Agoeng would have insisted that Nakagusuku Wan was still a rather dangerous place. When this ship arrived on May 27, four to six bombs, all near misses, welcomed her to Okinawa. She claimed direct hits on three planes on May 28. One June 3, a stray shell fragment from a strafing plane wounded an Army private. The crew of the Dutch-flagged vessel manned one 37mm gun, while the Armed Guards manned the other, claiming credit for two and one-half planes (this is presumed to mean two planes and an assist). The Berea Victory was credited with three assists on May 28. She reported that bombs fell on two occasions, but they were not very close.

By the end of May, the worst of the fighting at Okinawa was over for merchant ships, but there was still some action. The reduction in peril to merchant ships is probably best attributed to the excellent fighter screen created by Marine Corps pilots. From May 22 to July 12, according to the William H. Dale, there were 86 alerts, but planes only came near Hagushi only some 20 times. These figures testify to the efficiency of the fighter screen.

On June 3 the Cape Bon fired at a plane which fell into the water near another ship. It is impossible to assign definite credit in such cases. The Norman Hapgood was credited with an assist on June 11. After assisting in the destruction of a plane on June 3, the Walter Colton had a narrow escape on June 11 when a plane missed her bridge by only a few feet. Water, gasoline, and debris were thrown over the decks. Shell fragments injured several “Seabees” and one passenger had his helmet knocked off by a .50 caliber bullet. The Belle of the West had four fragmentation bombs fall 100 yards from her bow on June 17 and was showered by bomb fragments. On June 16 shell fragments landed around the Geo