Trump's Gaza deal may have a better chance than you think
Even as President Trump was announcing his twenty point peace plan to bring an end to the Gaza War, critics were already poking holes in its contents.
In particular, they cited Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement that Israel would retain a “security corridor” on Gaza territory. Netanyahu did indeed say this, no doubt to pacify the extremists in his government who wish to rid Gaza of the Gazans. But the actual proposal says nothing of the sort.
On the contrary, Trump’s proposal states that the U.S. “will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilization Force to immediately deploy in Gaza” and then goes on to add that “Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. As the [stabilization force] establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to international] guarantors, and the United States.”
The proposal does allow for “a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat.” Nevertheless, there is no way that either the Arab countries that choose to participate in the International Stabilization Force, or Indonesia (which may also volunteer to provide troops to the peacekeeping force), would agree to any sort of Israeli long-term presence on any part of Gaza. Likewise, the actual area that the perimeter will cover will not be determined by Israel alone.
It is true that Netanyahu has not said when and if he will bring the agreement to his Cabinet. Critics assert that he may have promised something in English, but will say something rather different in Hebrew when in Jerusalem. Yet he has publicly accepted the proposal and cannot afford to wiggle out of it, lest Trump turn on him.
Of course, Netanyahu knows that once he brings the agreement to a Cabinet vote — which eventually he must if Hamas accepts the Trump plan — both Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, who wish to expel the Gazans, will bolt the governing coalition. He also knows that Opposition Leader Yair Lapid has offered to join the government to replace the two extremists, meaning that Netanyahu can remain in power at least until the next election, scheduled for a year from now. That, of course, assumes that what Lapid promised months ago would still hold now. More than anything else, therefore, Netanyahu’s public acceptance of the Trump plan risks his own departure from the prime ministership.
There are also critics who have asserted that the Arab states supporting the Trump plan are merely humoring the president. Yet those states willing to contribute troops to the stabilization force would do so on the condition that the plan ultimately leads to a Palestinian state. The plan may not explicitly call for a state, but it does anticipate that the Palestinian Authority will take over Gaza once it “has completed its reform program” that Trump and the Franco-Saudi proposal have called for.
Netanyahu is bitterly opposed to such a takeover. As he rightly points out, it would be the first concrete step toward a real Palestinian state. Moreover, by including the Palestinian Authority in his plan, Trump has taken a significant step toward harmonizing America’s position with that of its leading allies, who have all formally recognized a State of Palestine.
At the time of writing, it is far from clear that Hamas will accept the Trump Plan. The plan calls for Hamas to release all of the Israeli hostages; but doing so would rob the terrorist of its only leverage. The plan also requires Hamas to demilitarize; it has vehemently reiterated that it will not do so. That the plan offers Hamas members “amnesty” if they “decommission” their weapons may not be sufficient to convince whoever is leading the terrorists at present to agree to its terms.
Yet Hamas will be under tremendous pressure from almost all the Arab states who want to see an end to the war. The two leading non-Arab Sunni states — Turkiye and Indonesia — likewise support the plan. Turkiye reportedly is prepared to offer asylum to any Hamas personnel who seek it.
Hamas knows that if it rejects the plan outright, Trump will no doubt provide Israel with whatever weapons it requests to complete its takeover of Gaza. Hamas may therefore play for time. Trump might be willing to relent on the urgency of his timetable, but the group will not be able to stall for very long. It will be under increasing pressure to accept the agreement, and it's not as though Israel will be stopping its offensive in the meantime.
Ultimately, there is no telling whether the Trump plan, for all of its support within and outside the Middle East, will meet with success or go the way of all the peace plans that have preceded it in the last three decades. Nevertheless, if the plan does come to fruition, then however much Norwegians detest Trump, the Norwegian Nobel Committee will have no choice but to award him the Peace Prize he so desperately covets.
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.