The Tension Between What the Army Is and What It Does

Gian P. Gentile

Security,

There's a key question the U.S. fighting force needs to answer before moving forward.

What is the heart of the United States Army?

Is the U.S. Army’s heart about cooperation and integration into one army made up of its three major component parts—the Regular Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve? Or is the heart of the Army fundamentally about fighting power and effectiveness?

The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) recently released its much-anticipated report to the president and the Congress. The NCFA took a stand in answering this question by emphasizing the absolute importance of the Army’s three components becoming one total force. Although the commission comes down on the side of one total force, it argues that doing so will enable the Army to be an effective fighting force as well.

The commission’s report thus manifests a tension between what the Army is—the relationship between its three components—and what the Army does—provide effective forces to fight the nation’s wars.

Cooperation and integration of the Army’s three components is important, but what’s most important is effectiveness in war—as demonstrated by the power to defeat America’s enemies in sustained land combat—and the key to that is trained, properly organized and ready forces. If that means using a combination of the three components in one total army, then so be it.

Interestingly enough, this tension goes back to the founding of the nation and has played out over time. George Washington understood the tension. In 1783, near the end of the American Revolutionary War, he recommended to Congress that the Army should be centered on a small but highly trained and professional Regular Army. In Washington’s eyes, the militias of the several states (civilians who either through compulsion or volunteerism gave part of their time in military service to the states) were very important because they could provide either individuals or units—assuming they were properly organized and trained—to become federal assets and expand the Army in times of war and crisis.