It Takes Two to Thucydides

Merriden Varrall

Security, Asia

It is shorthand for the idea that China's growing power represents a structural shift which threatens U.S. power.

There has been a lot of talk of late in the security and international relations community about the Thucydides trap, and more specifically that China and the United States find themselves in one. But there are two important problems with the way the maxim is being used that have more than just academic implications.

To refresh the memories of those who didn't study ancient Greek history, Thucydides was an historian who in 461BC wrote a history of the Peloponnesian War (431-404BC) between the Athenian Empire (the status quo power) and the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta (the rising power). The war reshaped the ancient Greek world. Athens, formerly the dominant power, with vast maritime capabilities, was devastated, and Sparta became the leading power. The economic costs were enormous, and felt across the whole region. Thucydides famously wrote (according to the most common if not necessarily the most accurate translation) that “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”

The “Thucydides trap” as it is now understood is used to explain and predict what is happening in power politics in the Asian region; it is shorthand for the idea that China's growing power represents a structural shift which threatens U.S. power. The conventional wisdom now runs that China, exercising its growing power, will bump up against U.S. power, and thus runs a high risk of causing conflict: “The pre-eminent geostrategic challenge of this era is not violent Islamic extremists or a resurgent Russia. It is the impact of China's ascendance.”

There are two problems with the use of Thucyides’ maxim as it is applied to contemporary circumstances.